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Evaluating the conditions for China’s 
4th Industrial Revolution Plan:  
A neo-Schumpeterian Analysis 
by 
Chan Hing Lee Henry 
Abstract : 
After 33 years (1979-2011) of close to double digit average annual 
economic growth, the Chinese economy decelerated to a mid-high single digit 
growth of approximately 7% per year since 2012. The country is currently facing 
the typical economic transition challenge of moving from being a high-middle 
income to high income economy. In response to this economic transition, the 
government launched an industrial innovation program that corresponds to the 4th 
Industrial Revolution in 2015-Made in China 2025, hoping to stabilize and 
rejuvenate China’s growth momentum through innovation. This thesis examines 
the pre-conditions for the successful implementation of this plan using the three-
levels analysis framework of neo-Schumpeterian Economics -micro, meso, and 
macro.  
The thesis examines the rationale of using neo-Schumpeterian Economics 
in the study, rather than the conventional Solow Model or any of its variants. It also 
discusses the advantages of using neo-Schumpeterian framework over the New 
Structural school promoted by prominent Chinese economist, Justin Lin.  
At the micro-level, the thesis looks at whether the country possesses the 
necessary human capital, entrepreneurship, innovation, and execution capabilities 
to implement the plan. For any new industries to succeed in a country, these factors 
are the necessary micro-level pre-conditions under neo-Schumpeterian Economics. 
  
 
The thesis uses various proxies to demonstrate that these factors are available in 
China for its Made in China 2025. 
At the meso-level, the thesis uses the technological regime developed in 
2000 by neo-Schumpeterian economists, Stefano Breschi, Franco Malerba and 
Luigi Orsenigo to study China’s high speed train industry. The thesis identifies two 
basic factors behind the success in building China’s new high speed rail industry 
base on the model. Firstly, China has an existing ecosystem with good innovation 
and absorption capabilities. Secondly, it has a strong, innovative institution that 
provides critical supports to nascent industries. The thesis builds a model on the 
technology and market innovation on high speed rail in China at the meso-level. It 
argues that the model remains valid today and the Chinese government has 
demonstrated the ability to mobilize the necessary linkages in the model to make it 
work. The ability to execute industrial policy provides the necessary preconditions 
for success under meso-level neo-Schumpeterian framework.  
At the macro-level, the thesis examines the various government programs 
in building national capacity at micro-level and building innovative industries under 
the 4th Industrial Revolution Plan, Made in China 2025. The government had 
demonstrated the ability to play the role of a strong, innovative institution that is 
critical in the success on the meso-level’s new high speed rail industry. Under neo-
Schumpeterian Economics, the presence of an “effective” government at micro-
level and meso-level is the pre-condition of success at the macro-level.  
Based on the analyses, the thesis draws the conclusion that China does 
possess the necessary pre-conditions to succeed in its transformation journey into 
an innovation-driven economy under its 4th Industrial Revolution Plan. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction:  
The speed and scale of China’s economic growth is unprecedented in the 
world economic history.1 In 1980, China was one of the poorest countries in the 
world with a real  per capita GDP of only 2.5% of the US, slightly behind India’s. 
Since then, China’s real per capita GDP has grown by more than 7% annually. As 
a result, in 2014, it was more than 24% of the US and 130% higher than that of 
India’s2. It is the only country that had experienced higher than 7% average real per 
capita GDP growth of longer than 35 years. Today, the rapid and sustained 
improvement in average living standard in a country with 18% of the world’s 
population has put China in the position of being the second largest economy in the 
world in nominal term and the biggest in purchasing power parity (PPP).  
 The exponential look-alike shape of GDP per capita in current USD from 
1980 to 2014 and the annual GDP growth rate in the same period show the success 
of economic growth at that time.   
 
Fig 1. China’s economic development indicators: GDP per capita and GDP 
growth3 
                                                            
1Wang, G. (2013). Preface. In Y. Zheng (Ed.), China: Development and Governance (p. Viii). 
Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Pte. 
2 Author’s calculation based on Knoema database. Retrieved from www.knoema.com. 
3 The World Bank. (2016).  GDP per capita (current US$). Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/CN?page=6&display=default  
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Reforms define Chinese growth since 1979 and the thesis:  
The Chinese economy was running strictly along the Soviet style central 
planning model since the 1st Five-year plan from 1953 until the reform years of 
1979. The country was one of the low-income countries at that time and the 
government planning system allocates economic resources rather than the market. 
Under the economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping in late 1970s, the 
government gradually handles two transitions at the same time: movement from a 
socialist-planned economy to a market economy, and movement from a low-income 
developing country up the ladder. The complexity of the transitions always marks 
the Chinese economic growth, and the unique feature of China’s economic growth 
is that government-initiated policy reforms play a key role in guiding the transition. 
The experience defied conventional textbook case analyses. One can only 
understand the Chinese economic development if he or she looks at it from the 
vantage point of policy reform4. The Chinese growth experience demonstrated that 
planned economy actually has policies that have led to the rapid economic 
development.  
The country moves from low income country to low-middle income country 
in mid 1990s and high-middle income country in early-mid 2000s. The speedy 
growth put the country at the threshold of Middle Income Trap around the turn of 
2010s. 
                                                            
The World Bank. (2016). GDP growth (annual %). Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG/countries/CN?page=6&display=defa
ult  
4 Lin, J. (2016, April 29). Speech on Demystifying the Chinese Economy. Speech presented at 
World Bank.  
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The inevitable economic growth challenge facing a high-middle income 
country when the rising labour cost renders its traditional growth pillar 
uncompetitive in the global market place, thus forcing it to move into higher value-
added and technologically more sophisticated industries to keep up the growth 
momentum or get stuck in the Middle Income Trap.   The Chinese government has 
put up an industrial development program- Made in China 2025, to meet both the 
technology challenges posed to its exiting industries by the Fourth Industrial 
Revolution as well as to overcome the Middle Income Trap5. 
The Chinese economic growth experience had elicited extensive academic 
interests. Many scholars have argued that the Chinese growth experience contains 
too much political economic elements and it is not easy to replicate elsewhere6. The 
thesis posits that while China ‘s growth record is unprecedented and not easy to 
replicate, the experience is not incomprehensible and can probably be replicated. 
The thesis posits that government-initiated economic reform of China is a 
kind of organizational innovation that facilitates the innovations in the five areas of 
innovation defined by Joseph Schumpeter. 7 Schumpeterian economics’ variant, 
neo-Schumpeterian economics provides a good tool in the study of innovation 
economics.  
                                                            
5 Wong, J. (2016, April 23). Why China will not fall into the Middle Income Trap. Strait Times. 
Retrieved April 23, 2016, from http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/why-china-will-not-fall-into-
the-middle-income-trap 
6 Naughton, B. (2010, June). China's Distinctive System: Can it be a model for others? Journal of 
Contemporary China, 19(65), 437-460. Retrieved 
from http://www.eastwestcenter.org/sites/default/files/filemanager/ASDP/TitleVI2013/Naughton.p
df 
7 The five area of innovations are: introduction of new products; introduction of new production 
methods; opening up of new markets; opening up of new source of materials; new organizational 
forms in any industry that improve economic outcome. 
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This thesis looks at the pre-conditions for the successful implementation of 
Made in China 2025 using the three levels of neo-Schumpeterian Economics.  The 
thesis posits that any country which can meet the conditions set-up in the three 
levels of neo-Schumpeterian Economics stands a good chance to succeed in its 
industrial development efforts and hence, replicates Chinese growth.  
The thesis devotes considerable spaces in the introduction section to the 
Chinese economic reform history and the evolution of economic growth theory. 
The extensive discussions of the two topics provided the necessary background to 
support the choice of using neo-Schumpeterian analysis in the context of China’s 
economic development and the Made in China 2025 plan.   
Chinese economy in the reform era - 
There are different ways to characterize China’s post-reform growth phases. 
They are not vastly different from each other and here we use the timeline suggested 
by Zhu8 before 2012 and that of Wong after 20129. The Chinese reform timeline is 
linked to entrepreneurship boom as both Zhu and Wong had observed. This 
validates the Schumpeterian view that innovations and entrepreneurships are 
closely linked10.  
Agricultural reform, 1978-1984 
                                                            
8 Zhu, X. (20120. Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present & Future. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 26(4), 103-124. Retrieved April 9, 2016, from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2329028   
9 Wong, J. (2016). Zhu Rongji & China's Economic Take-off. Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing Pte. 
10 Entrepreneurs bring innovations to the market to satisfy their personal motives. Hence periods of 
elevated innovations provide more opportunities for entrepreneurs to emerge.  
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The country’s move from a socialist-planned economy to its current 
dynamic form started in 1978 when the government adopted a general policy of 
“reform and opening up”, also known as Gaige Kaifang in Chinese. There was no 
systemic design of reform policies. Instead, a consensus within the government was 
made, in which reform policies must be gradual, experimental and pragmatic. The 
initial move started in 1978 with the agricultural reform. Farmers were allowed to 
become contractors of land and were allowed to keep all production in excess of 
the government quota. The incentives worked so well that the resultant productivity 
gain in agriculture helped push farmers away from jobs in agriculture, but at the 
same time maintaining a stable food price. Freeing farmers from agricultural 
activities and shifting to higher-value secondary and tertiary activities provided the 
initial boost to the economy in the reform era. 11  Other gradual reforms were 
implemented in the agricultural sector and by mid-2000s, all agricultural activities 
were market price-based and all agricultural taxes were abolished.  
The shift in employment from agriculture to manufacturing and services in 
China’s economic development can be seen in fig 2 below, where employment in 
the primary sector (blue line) decreased over time while employment in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors (orange and grey lines) increased. 
                                                            
11 This pattern of cheap labour driven initial development model is the famous Lewis model. It 
explains the growth of a developing economy in terms of labour transition from subsistence rural 
sector to higher value added secondary and tertiary sector. 
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Fig 2. China’s employment by sectors (in million population)12 
 
Economic reforms and growth:  
(1) 1984-1988: Rise of the non-state sector and “Reform without Losers” 
 The success of agricultural reform can be seen in fig 1. GDP growth between 
1981 to 1984 emboldened the government to initiate two market reforms in non-
agricultural sectors. First, a dual-track system was introduced into the market. State-
owned enterprises (SOEs) were given quotas for both production input and output 
based on government-set prices, but at the same time, they were also allowed to buy 
input and output beyond these quotas at market prices. In the dual market, 
production in excess of the quota ran at market-based pricing while those within 
quota production ran at government-mandated prices. The incentive to work hard 
and produce more than one’s quota is obvious. Small-scale individual businesses 
and foreign investment inside special economic zones were also allowed to engage 
in economic activities specially reserved for SOEs under the socialist system 
mentioned previously. Second, the central government devolved economic 
decision-making to local governments and allowed lower-level governments to set 
                                                            
12 CEIC. Employment by sectors (in million population). Retrieved from 
https://www.ceicdata.com/en 
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up rural, collectively-owned cooperatives known as township and village 
enterprises (TVEs). As a result, provincial-, city-, and county-level governments 
controlled most of the SOEs, while township and village governments controlled 
TVEs. The number of TVEs increased from 1.52 million in 1978 to 18.88 million 
in 198813. This was the first burst of entrepreneurial activity in communist takeover 
in 1949. Though TVEs were theoretically still owned by the government, they were 
not subjected to government planning controls. 
 Preserving the quota-based, low-price socialist system, at the same time 
providing more goods at a higher market-based price, preserve employment at 
SOEs and provide employment to excess agricultural workers at TVEs. This is a 
unique feature of that period and it was called “Reform without Losers”. 
(2) 1988-1998: From “Reform without Losers” to inevitable trade-
offs: 
The strategy in the earlier period to allow the non-state sector to grow, 
without downsizing the state sector, ran its course by the end of the 1980s and 
early1990s. Increasing losses from SOEs due to market competition forced the 
government to cut its support on SOEs in the mid-1990s. Many small SOEs and 
TVEs were allowed to close or privatize through management buyouts, while some 
large SOEs were converted to corporate organizations. Many of the privatized 
SOEs or TVEs survived to become the core of Chinese small and medium-size 
businesses today, particularly in manufacturing. This was the second wave of 
entrepreneurial activity.    
                                                            
13 Zhu, X. (2012). Understanding China’s Growth: Past, Present & Future. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 26(4), 103-124. Retrieved April 9, 2016, from 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2329028 
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(3) 1998-2007: Encourage private enterprises and trade liberalization 
The government legitimized private businesses in late-1997 and the country 
joined the WTO in 2001. These twin impetuses propelled the Chinese economy into 
a new phase of growth, as shown in fig 1. The famous BAT (Baidu, Alibaba, 
Tencent) were all small, private start-ups formed in the immediate years after the 
legitimization of private businesses in 1998. This was the third wave of 
entrepreneurial activity with many private start-up going into foreign trade. This 
period saw the explosion of Chinese foreign trade with increasing private 
participation. 
Fig 3 shows the acceleration of China’s foreign trade from 1980 to 2014. It was 
during this period of time that China became known as the “Factory of the World”. 
  
Fig 3. China’s foreign trade14 
(4) 2008-2012: 2008 Global financial crisis and massive government 
stimulus  
                                                            
14 CEIC. Foreign trade. Retrieved from https://www.ceicdata.com/en 
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The government launched a massive RMB 4.0 trillion stimulus program in 
late 2008, immediately after the 2008 global financial crisis. From 2008 to 2012, 
while China’s nominal GDP accounted for 10-11% of global nominal GDP, the 
economic growth of China accounted for 30-35% of global economic growth. 
China was the world’s growth engine at that time. The period reinforced China’s 
position as the dominant exporting country and trading country in the world. 
However, its economy faced an inevitable slowdown from years of hyper-growth 
and the structural challenges involved in becoming a high-income country, chief 
among them sharply rising wages (fig 4) and declining productivity15.  
 
Fig 4. Rapid increase in hourly wages in China16 
(5) 2013-present: The new normal 
                                                            
15 Liu, Z. (2015). Is China’s Growth Miracle Over? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
Economic Letter. Retrieved from http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-
letter/2015/august/china-economic-growth-miracle-slowdown/ 
16 Cesar, J. (2016). The Automation Industry in China. Mirae Asset Lens Issue 7, Part I: 
Automation in China. Retrieved from 
http://www.miraeasset.com/export/sites/com.miraeasset.www/asia/LENS7-
Part1/file/Mirae_Asset_LENS_Issue_7_Part_I.pdf  
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From an average annual growth of 10% between 1979 to 2011, Chinese 
economic growth dropped to 7.8% in 2012. The earlier favourable growth factors 
of cheap and abundant labour, cheap capital input fuelled by high domestic savings, 
and high productivity from technology adoption, have slowly lost their driving 
power to the economy. In 2013, the government announced the dawning of The 
New Normal in the economy. This brought the economy’s lower growth 
performance to light, and resulted in the change of economic growth drivers from 
factors accumulation to productivity driven. The key to productivity improvement 
is innovation and the government called for a transformation of the economic 
growth model into an innovation-driven one.  
The 4th Industrial Revolution Plan - Made in China 2025: 
China’s economic growth has been characterized by punctuated reforms and 
bursts of growth17. The Chinese government is the key pillar in the continuing 
process of reform, growth and change since the 1978 economic reform.  In its drive 
to reinvigorate the economy, the government promulgated the 4th Industrial 
Revolution Plan - Made in China 2025 - in May 2015. Supplemented by a detailed 
technological development roadmap in a Green Book, the plan sets out broad 
objectives in the nationwide drive for innovation, manufacturing efficiency, 
digitization and green development in its original policy paper18,19. The Green Book 
                                                            
17 Lin, J. (2016, April 29). Speech on Demystifying the Chinese Economy. Speech presented at 
World Bank. 
18 China State Council中国国务院 (2015). Notice on Made in China 2025 国务院关于印发《中
国制造 2025》的通知 (Publication). 中国国务院. 
19 China Strategic Industry Council 国家制造强国建设战略咨询委员会 (2015). Technology Map 
for Made in China 2025《中国制造 2025》重点领域技术路线图 (pp. 1-184, Publication). 北京: 
国家制造强国建设战略咨询委员会. 
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is an industrialization drive covering 10 strategic areas: advanced information 
technology; advanced computerized numerical control machine tools & robotics; 
aerospace & aeronautical equipment; maritime equipment and high-tech vessels; 
modern rail equipment; new energy vehicle and equipment; power equipment; 
agricultural equipment; new materials; biopharmaceutical and advanced medical 
devices. Made in China 2025 declared that the state will emphasize innovation as 
the driver of economic growth.  
Made in China 2025 recognizes that there are two main patterns of 
innovation in industries. The first one is the creative destruction pattern where 
innovations are introduced by industries that have not innovated enough, resulting 
in its widening technological distance as compared to its global peers. This is also 
called ‘widening’. The second one is a creative accumulation pattern, whereby 
innovations are introduced by industries that have innovated before and its 
technological distance from global peer is manageable. This is also called 
‘deepening’. Based on each industry’s technological distance from the global peer, 
Made in China 2025 sets specific technological innovation targets for each industry, 
some ‘widening’ and some ‘deepening’.  
China’s industrial share was 37% of its GDP and its manufacturing share 
was more than 30% in 2013. The successful implementation of Made in China 2025 
is critical to China’s economic growth and relevant to its catch-up with developed 
countries.   
 ‐ 12 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
 
Fig.5 Breakdown of GDP by sector20 
Empirical evidence shows that all developed countries always build their 
economy on a few anchor industries. These developed countries are able to 
continuously innovate to keep their leading industries at the global frontier, and 
incessant innovation power underpin their success to stay as developed countries. 
While a successful company easily comes and goes, a globally leading industry has 
a long term traction. Though the Made in China 2025 was designed as an industrial 
development plan, in the case of China, it is actually a national economic reform 
and growth plan2122.  
Using neo-Schumpeterian Analysis in lieu of Solow Growth Model in the study 
Economists from Adam Smith and David Ricardo to John Maynard Keynes 
and Joseph Schumpeter have sought to identify the factors behind the long-term 
                                                            
20 CEIC. Foreign trade. Retrieved from https://www.ceicdata.com/en 
21 Developing countries economic plan are supply side driven and they are essentially industrial 
development plan.  This is in contrary to developed countries economic plan which are mostly 
demand side plan. Interested party can read the paper of John Wong in footnote 22. 
22 Wong, J. (2016, June 7). China's macroeconomic conundrum. The Strait Times. Retrieved 
September 6, 2016, from http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/chinas-macroeconomic-conundrum 
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economic growth of countries. The study of a country’s economic growth is one of 
the key areas in macroeconomics. Our analytical shift from the conventional Solow 
model to the neo-Schumpeterian approach can best be explained by revisiting the 
earlier models of economic development since Adam Smith, and by studying 
China’s current economic transition challenge and policy of promoting innovation 
as its economic growth driver. Here, we will provide the necessary background 
information, and discuss why the neo-Schumpeter model is more applicable than 
the neo-Classical Solow model to address our research question.  
A. The classical theory of economic growth:  
Classical economists such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo and Thomas 
Malthus anchored their economic ideas in the Malthusian population principle, the 
law of diminishing returns, and the theory of subsistence wages. They believed that 
a healthy, “normal” economic system is in a stationary state - that there is perfect 
competitive equilibrium with declining profits and no involuntary unemployment, 
and that the central problem of the economy was how to maintain an economic 
system’s balance and stasis through interacting economic forces. They believed in 
the concept of laissez faire and advocated minimum government intervention in the 
economy—Adam Smith’s “invisible hand”. They maintained that individual 
initiatives or Smith’s “self-interest”, if applied in competitive ways to promote 
personal ends, would serve the general interest in the properly functioning market 
system. This is further reinforced by Say’s Law of the Market (“supply creates 
demand”), which advocates that automatic adjustments in a capitalist market 
economy would ultimately ensure adequate demand for goods at full employment. 
 Classical economists thus believed that a properly functioning market 
economy would stimulate economic efficiency and growth. They further 
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maintained that a stream of productive inventions would stimulate growth by 
postponing the emergence of the stationary state23. 
B. Keynesian theory on economic growth: 
The Great Depression in the 1930s weakened the central argument of 
classical economists in their assumption of full employment and the related 
automatic market adjustment to equilibrium under the capitalist system. To restore 
economic order, Keynes proposed using state intervention.  
Keynes turned away from classical economists’ emphasis on the supply side 
to the demand side, putting the aggregate demand function at the centre of his 
analysis. He argued that the central problem of the Great Depression was the lack 
of “effective demand”, and that the solution to any economic recession caused by 
the same problem should be to increase aggregate demand through a direct increase 
in government expenditure or government policies, so as to stimulate private 
consumption and investment. In his view, demand creates supply and not the other 
way around. He recommended the combination of an expansionary fiscal policy 
along with an accommodating monetary policy to deal with the recession, and that 
a single injection of government spending is insufficient. Rather, a full scale and 
long term public spending programme is necessary to deal effectively with the deep 
recession.  
Keynes had not systematically analysed economic growth. However, his 
government-centric policy recommendations became the basis of Keynesian 
development planning that was popular from the post-war years up until the 1960s24. 
                                                            
23 Bhattacharya, D. (1989). Economic Development & Underdevelopment. Sydney, Australia: 
Australian Professional Publications. pp24-25 
24 Kuhihara, K. K. (1965). The Keynesian theory of Economic Development. London: George 
Allen & Unwin. p19 
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More importantly, his national income analysis laid the foundation for the 
emergence of macroeconomics, focusing on the technical relationship of such 
aggregates as savings, consumption, investment, and employment.  It also led to the 
popularity of development planning in the post-war years. 
C. Modern Growth Theory- the Harrod-Domar model 
The modern growth theory originated from the work of Harrod in 1939, and 
subsequently revised by Domar in 1946. This theory spun off from Keynes view on 
investment stimulus, and maintained that investment, savings and incremental 
capital-output ratio (ICOR) are important factors in economic development.  
Under the Harrod-Domar model, the economy’s “actual rate of growth” has 
to be equal to its “warranted rate of growth”. For this, the first step for economic 
policy makers is to come up with the right ICOR as well as the desired levels of 
investment and savings that would result in the target growth rate. In the long run, 
the economy will grow in accordance with its “natural rate of growth” that is 
basically determined by population growth. Interestingly, this model approaches 
growth from the supply side of classical economies, instead of the demand side of 
Keynesian economics. 
One of the biggest problem with the Harrod-Domar model is that it does not 
provide a mechanism of adjustment for the natural rate of growth in the economy. 
The natural rate of growth is defined not just as “the maximum rate of growth 
allowed by the increase of population”, but also the “accumulation of capital, 
technological improvement and the work/leisure preference schedule, supposing 
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that there is always full employment in some sense”25.  In modern jargon, it does 
not provide for productivity growth based on technological improvement.  
D. Neo-Classical Solow Growth Model: 
The Solow model has been the mainstream growth theory since its proposal 
by Robert Solow in 1956. It is based on the Harrod-Domar model. Under the 
Harrod-Domar growth theory, it is extremely difficult for the economy to reach the 
equilibrium rate of growth (or its “actual growth rate” coinciding with its 
“warranted growth rate”) because its key variables from savings to investment and 
from capital-output ratio to technological progress are perpetually subject to 
changes. Thus, the “Harrod-Domar economy” was always faced with a very narrow 
path for its equilibrium growth — the so-called “knife-edge equilibrium”. Because 
of this, Robert Solow proceeded to extend the Harrod-Domar growth theory to 
include more explanations for equilibrium26.  
The standard Solow model is represented by the equation Y= F (A, L, K). 
Y stands for GDP output, A stands for technology or production efficiency, L stands 
for labour input, and K stands for capital input. Under the assumption that 
technological change is disembodied and factor-neutral, the revised equation will 
be Y= A F (L, K). However, by refining the key variables of investment, saving and 
technological progress, numerous growth theories can also be spawned from the 
Solow model. The key takeaway is that the economy is more likely to achieve its 
warranted rate of growth if it is more flexible in adjusting the key variables. 
                                                            
25 Harrod, R. F. (1939). An Essay in Dynamic Theory. Economic Journal, 49(March), 14-33. 
26For further discussion of this topic, see Higgins, Benjamin: Economic Development: Principles, 
Problems and Policies (London, Constable and Company Ltd.1968). 
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In the Solow model, a nation’s income depends on two major factors of 
production. These are capital and labour, with time allowing for technological 
change deemed as the exogenous variable. In the model, capital and labour are 
perfectly substitutable and factors of production are paid according to the value of 
their marginal products.  
 Employing quantitative techniques, neo-classical economists are able to 
analyse the contributions of capital and labour inputs to national income growth. 
The famous growth equation Solow model is as follows: 
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where α ൌ ௅௒ ∗
డ௒
డ௅ (i.e. output elasticity of labour) and 	ߚ ൌ
௄
௒ ∗
డ௒
డ௄  (i.e. 
output elasticity of capital). 
The residual term called total factor productivity (TFP) is used to explain 
the growth in output that cannot be explained by growth in capital and labour. In 
the neo-classical view, total factor productivity is largely associated with 
technological progress and knowledge advancement.  
It can thus be seen that the standard Solow growth model is an extension of 
the classical approach to economic growth. For this, it has been dubbed the neo-
classical growth model. All these models emphasize on capital, labour and 
technological progress. However, human capital, entrepreneurship or human 
resource development, is still missing. 
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There are three ways to measure TFP27.  
The first way is to treat it as a measure of quantities of output per unit of 
aggregate input. The latter is calculated as a weighted average of all inputs. The 
weights are either the factor shares in output or the estimated output elasticities of 
corresponding input factors. In the case of the US, economists assume competitive 
equilibrium and profit maximization so that the elasticities are equal to the 
corresponding factor shares in output, i.e. the value of α is 0.7 and β is 0.3 (based 
on the famous but exceedingly simple Cobb-Douglas production function).  
The second way to measure TFP is through the estimation of a production 
function, which shows how output is related to a combinations of inputs. This 
method is used in China as the economy is not under perfect competition and profit 
maximization cannot be assumed. Hence, the corresponding factor shares in output 
cannot be assumed to take on the production function’s elasticities value. 
Economists obtain estimates of output elasticities of labour and capital by fitting a 
production function such as Cobb-Douglas’s with data: 
ܻ ൌ ܣܮఈܭఉ and in ܻ ൌ ܽ ൅ ߛܶ ൅ ߙ ln ܮ ൅ ߚ lnܭ ൅ ݑ.  
Wherein ln is the natural logarithm, a, γ, α, β are parameters to be estimated, 
and u is the random error.  
Since A, the productivity indicator, is approximated by a time trend, T, the 
estimate of γ shows the percentage of output growth that is attributed to the TFP 
growth. With so many estimators in the equation, it is common to see a wide range 
of TFP estimates from different studies. The heated debate which erupted in 
                                                            
27 Liu, Z. (2002). The Nature and Sources of Economic Growth in China: Is There TFP Growth? 
In China's Economy into the New Century (pp. 43-62). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing 
Pte. Ltd.  
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Singapore’s academic circle in the late 1990s reflects the measurement issue of TFP 
in East Asian economies28. 
The third way to measure TFP involves the estimation of the so-called 
production frontier. The frontier represents the best practice. In this context, TFP 
can grow from two sources. The first is efficiency gain, which is due to the 
narrowing of the gap between the current production position and the frontier. The 
second is the outward shift of the frontier itself, which is due to technological 
improvements over time. This method is difficult to apply and not commonly used.  
The absence of human capital in the standard Solow model gave rise to the 
endogenous growth theory, which Romer and Lucas from University of Chicago 
developed in the 1980s. This growth theory, ܻሺݐሻ ൌ ܣሺݐሻܮሺെݕݐሻ, essentially has 
only one input and one output and assumes that all productivity growth emanates 
from invention and creativity. Under this extreme Chicago argument, consumption 
and savings play are not addressed, and everything is human capital or human 
resource. 
Endogenous growth theory has since become the standard tool in the study 
of economic growth. It posits that growth is endogenous and is the result of 
deliberate, rational and optimal decisions by economic agents. Aside from labour 
and capital, new variables such as human capital are also incorporated into the 
production function. However, the endogenous growth model suffers from the same 
shortcomings as the original Solow model. It cannot explain what makes up the 
                                                            
28 Liu, Z. (2002). The Nature and Sources of Economic Growth in China: Is There TFP Growth? 
In China's Economy into the New Century (pp. 43-62). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Pte. 
Ltd.  
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residual term. As economist Moses Abramovitz said, “TFP is a measure of our 
ignorance”. It is convenient to use the original Solow model or its variant to 
examine ex-post economic performance as data on capital and labour are readily 
available. However, it is not easy to get an accurate TFP as elasticities data are all 
based on estimates. The ignorance of what makes up TFP deprives the model of 
policy recommendation power for the economy on an ex-ante basis, and the Solow 
model failed to answer these question: What are the sources of its productivity 
growth? What are the potential sources of productivity gains in the future?29  
The most widely used method in productivity measurement is labour 
productivity. It is the ratio of output to labour input, whereby labour input is 
measured in terms of number of workers or man-hours30. Labour productivity’s 
popularity arises from its simplicity and relative accuracy as compared to many 
sources of errors that we noted in the TFP index construction. 
E. Neo-Schumpeterian growth economics 
In contrast to the main stream Solow Model, its variant, the Endogenous 
Growth Model, treats economic growth as an additional economic output generated 
by additional input of labour, capital, or increased human capital modulated by TFP. 
Schumpeter considered modern economic growth to be productivity-driven as 
opposed to earlier pre-industrial revolution economic growth which is factor-
accumulation driven. He believed that innovation and entrepreneurship drive 
productivity gain in the economy. The figure below shows that economic growth – 
                                                            
29 Yu, T. (1995). Adaptive Response: Entrepreneurship and Economic Development in 
Hongkong (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). University of New South Wales. 
30 The Japanese economists take issue with this approach, as the Japanese workers are used to long 
working hours, often mixing work with leisure and other social activity. Japan and other Asian 
countries thus tend to measure labour productivity on a yearly basis 
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represented by the circular flow on the left – is triggered by the innovation input of 
the entrepreneurs that comes from their adoption of new ideas/products. 
  
Fig 6. Schumpeterian model of economic growth31 
Schumpeter’s view on economic development was not popular during his 
time. However, it gained popularity in the last three decades when new high-tech 
industry was the key economic development driver. Popular terms from 
Schumpeterian Economics such as creative destruction, productivity, innovation 
and entrepreneurship have become buzzwords in business school and government 
policy circles.   
Schumpeter’s view on economics is different from that of Classical and 
Keynesian economists because he sees the modern economy as being in a dynamic 
disequilibrium state which is always growing and changing. Hence, his economic 
growth is about unstable growth. For him, the study of structural change caused by 
                                                            
31 Mitra, S. (2013). Schumpeterian Model of Economic Growth. Retrieved from 
http://www.slideshare.net/satyakimitra/schumpeterian-model-of-economic-growth. Modified by 
the author on April 24, 2016. 
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the innovations of entrepreneurs is the main problem of economics. He defines 
innovation as:  
 The introduction of new products; 
 The introduction of new methods of production; 
 The opening up of new markets; 
 The opening up of new sources of raw material; 
 New organization forms in any industry that improves economic 
outcome. 
Innovation is the core principle underlying Schumpeterian Economics, and 
it takes over the role of market price as the driving force of economic development. 
Innovation competition replaces price competition in the market as the coordination 
mechanism of interest. Though price is still important in the market, it is not central 
to economic development. The economy which relies on input resources and price 
signals alone is not effective in stimulating productivity gains nor economic 
development. The goal of all economic policies should be the promotion of higher 
productivity through greater innovation and promotion of entrepreneurship. 
Modulating business cycles or economic fluctuations should take the innovation 
cycle into account. 
Neo-Schumpeterian Economics combines elements of the original 
Schumpeterian Economics with ideas from evolutionary economics, complexity 
economics, system theory and industrial life-cycle disciplines. The synthesis states 
that aside from the Schumpeterian growth process of innovation and 
entrepreneurship, the economy is more of a complex biological system than a 
simple mechanistic system. This implies that interactions going on between 
different elements within the economic system are difficult to describe in a 
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mechanistic input-output fashion. It also posits that the study of innovation must be 
approached through different layers (micro-, meso- and macro- levels) through a 
system study approach, and that it should take different industry environments into 
account as in industry life cycle study. The recognition of different layers in the 
economic system and the relevance of the industry life cycle make the use of 
simplified mathematical model difficult in neo-Schumpeterian analysis. 
Furthermore, neo-Schumpeterian analysis’ emphasis on diversity also makes it 
unpopular with econometricians because it calls to attention the non-linearity and 
dynamic nature of innovations and their impact on the economy, making it hard to 
derive a fixed model32. 
However, neo-Schumpeterian economics’ model-unfriendly nature and 
emphasis of environmental diversity are exactly why it is used as a framework in 
government economic policy. The attention to economic and innovation 
environments at the micro-, meso- and macro- levels make policy recommendations 
based on the discipline closer to the ground and more readily implementable. 
The general policy recommendations of neo-Schumpeterian Economics 
are33: 
 Emphasis on knowledge creation, diffusion and their transformation into 
innovation; 
 The removal of constraints that inhibit economic factor input from 
reaching its full potential under the status quo; 
                                                            
32 Paul Samuelson, who pioneer the analytical(mathematical) approach to Economics and dubbed 
“Father of Modern Economics”, was a graduate student of Schumpeter at Harvard. Schumpeter 
was one of the best mathematician in the economics department at Harvard, it is interesting to note 
that he did not use mathematics in his innovation based economic growth theory. 
 
33 Hanusch, H., & Pyka, A. (2007). Principles of neo-Schumpeterian Economics. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 31, 275-289. 
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 Since qualitative changes within the economy happen in a punctuated 
fashion, policies should be flexible enough to handle both regular, stable 
periods as well as times of radical change; 
 The dynamic growth process shows strong non-linearity and a positive 
feedback effect. Though the process is not easy to model, it does show a 
certain pattern and some form of structure. Economic policymaking 
should be based on the pattern observed.  
The ideas of creative destruction from transformational technological 
revolution, creative accumulation from incremental innovation are associated with 
neo-Schumpeterian Economics. 
F. China’s current economic transition challenges: 
From our discussion of economic growth process, an economy can grow by 
either employing more production inputs (labour and capital) or by becoming more 
efficient in order to derive more output per unit of input. The former is factor 
accumulation while the latter is productivity improvement34. For any economy, 
innovation and technological progress are the fundamental sources of its long term 
productivity growth. China’s speedy growth in the past was essentially derived 
from a favourable combination of capital and labour factor accumulation with 
simultaneous productivity improvement. The high domestic savings and abundant 
rural labour force migrating to urban areas permitted the economy to use capital 
and labour factor accumulation to drive the economic growth. At the same time, 
technological progress associated with imported technology and initial market 
                                                            
34 We use classical Solow model here in the discussion and assume human capital to be part of 
productivity to simplify discussion. 
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reform pushed economic growth further. However, China has now exhausted such 
easy “low-hanging fruits” and is facing higher and higher “Incremental Capital 
Output Ratio” (ICOR). On top of that, “demographic dividend” from rural labour 
force migration is exhausting. The factor accumulation path of economic 
development is running out of steam. At the same time, China must move to higher 
value-added activities and compete against its former imported technology provider, 
and the rivalry means that China cannot rely on convenient imported technology 
anymore to drive the productivity improvement side of the economic growth.  Both 
capital efficiency and future productivity gains to drive the economy must come 
increasingly from its own R&D efforts35. 
In recent years, China has rapidly expanded its R&D activities, which 
reached 2.1% of GDP in 2014, compared to the 2.8% for the US and 3.4% for Japan. 
In absolute term, however, China’s share of R&D spending is the second largest in 
the world and its GDP base is now number two in the world. In 2014, the “Nature 
Index/ Global” which tracks the sources of publication of high-quality scientific 
papers also ranked China second for publishing the world’s largest number of high-
quality scientific papers. The first is the US. With more than 3.5 million R&D 
personnel (seven times more than new university graduates every year) and an 
industrial base that is rapidly expanding and increasingly sophisticated, China is 
admittedly on track to develop a viable technological base that will eventually 
generate new sources of productivity increases to support future economic 
growth.36 
                                                            
35 Wong, J. (2016). Zhu Rongji & China's Economic Take-off. Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing Pte. 
 
36 Ibid. 
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We should note that a high R&D expenditure itself plus the training of a 
large number of high-level manpower do not automatically translate into successful 
commercial innovations and economic benefits. Many patents and inventions do 
not end up in successful commercial applications. They depend on the conducive 
institutional environment to help upgrade existing industries and foster emergence 
of new high value-added industries. Institutional innovation also involves the 
fostering of transformational type of leadership. Empirical observations on the 
emergence of innovative industries around the world points to the importance of 
transformational type of entrepreneurs such as Bill Gates and Steve Jobs in the US, 
Matsushita and Morita in Japan, Chung Ju Yung and Lee Byung Chul in South 
Korea.  
G. Current Innovation Drive of China: 
The Chinese government is consistent in promoting science and technology 
innovation since Deng Xiaoping’s 1978 reform. In 1978, then-Vice Premier Deng 
announced in the joint meeting of National Conference on Science and Technology, 
the biennial conference of Chinese Academy of Science (CAS) and Chinese 
Academy of Engineer (CAE) that “science & technology (S&T) are productive 
forces”37. This change of state emphasizes on productive forces from proletariat 
workers to S&T intellectuals overturned Mao’s dogma and ushered in spring for 
Chinese S&T development38.  
                                                            
37 The three in one meeting only happens twice in the history of People’s Republic of China. The 
first one was the 1978 meeting with keynote speech by Deng and the second one in 2016 with 
keynote speech by Xi. Xi promised the government’s full support to the innovations and 
independence of S&T development in 2016.  
38 Zhao, L. (2016). CHIINA’S INNOVATION-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT UNDER XI JINPING 
(Rep. No. Background Brief 1143). Singapore: EAI. 
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Successive leaders after Deng have all used the National Conference of 
Science and Technology to unveil their strategies for S&T development. In 1995, 
Jiang Zemin announced the strategy of rejuvenating the nation through science and 
education (科教兴国战略). In 2006, Hu Jintao followed up on a strategy of 
building the country through human resources development (人才强国战略).  All 
these attempts were focused on building the human capital base of S&T innovation.  
At the 18th Communist Party Congress in which President Xi Jinping 
assumed China’s leadership, the country officially endorsed the strategy of 
innovation-driven development. He was an enthusiastic supporter on innovation-
driven economic growth and his speech on innovation was compiled into a book by 
the communist party’s central committee literature research office. This book is 
titled “Excerpts of Xi Jinping’s Remarks on Science and Technology Innovation”.  
In May 2015, the government announced the plan to move China to an 
advanced manufacturing country through Made in China 2025, listing 10 industries 
as focal points. At the end of 2015, the specified technological target in the 10 
industries are published. In early May 2016, the country issued the Outline of the 
National Strategy of Innovation-Driven Development (国家创新驱动发展战略纲
要). In the 13th Five-year plan adopted by the National People Congress on March 
2016, innovation was the first objective mentioned in the “five-in-one” target to 
build a country of “innovation, coordinated development, green, open society and 
inclusive shared development”.  
Jiang and Hu’s emphasis on human capacity build-up in their S&T policy 
has changed to emphasis on innovation under the incumbent Xi administration. In 
a way, the change in emphasis demonstrates the success of earlier human resources 
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build-up, and shows that now is the time to harvest the developed human capital to 
meet China’s changing economic challenges. President Xi had articulated that for 
China’s ongoing S&T reform has only one objective. This is to “further breakdown 
the barriers between S&T and economic and social development”39. The Chinese 
government is pushing the integration of S&T innovation and economic 
development in an unprecedented way.  
H. Using neo-Schumpeterian analysis in lieu of the Solow model  
In our thesis, the choice of using neo-Schumpeterian analysis instead of the 
neo-Classical Solow model or its variant, the endogenous growth model, is 
attributable to the following reasons: 
(1) All developed countries recognize the importance of innovation and 
entrepreneurship in driving the economy forward. Industrial development 
plan akin to Made in China 2025 were adopted by all major industrial 
powers40.  Though China is still a middle income country, it is the biggest 
manufacturing and manufactured goods exporting country in the world. 
The country already declared explicitly that innovation will be the driver 
of the economy going forward. The theoretical choice of studying 
innovation and entrepreneurship is always Schumpeterian model or its 
variant. There are many available resources on hand at industry (meso) and 
firm (micro) level from business schools around the world. Though these 
materials are mostly empirical in nature, they are accepted academically 
                                                            
39 Ibid. 
40 Industries 4.0 of Germany (2013), New Industrial France of France (2013), National Network 
for Manufacturing Innovation of US (2013), White Paper for Manufacturing of Japan (2014), 
British Manufacturing 2050 of UK (2015), Manufacturing 3.0 of South Korea (2014) 
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and often superior to mathematical models derived from Solow models in 
predicting outcome. 
(2) Our thesis is going to answer the research question of whether China 
possesses the necessary conditions for success in its 4th Industrial 
Revolution Plan, Made in China 2025. The plan is an industry base plan 
and the Solow Model is a generic macroeconomic input-output model. 
Solow model cannot work at industry level, while neo-Schumpeterian 
meso-level industry study, working together with micro-level human 
capital innovators and macro level institutional reform, can provide a 
framework of analysis that can answer our research question. The 
empirical nature of the neo-Schumpeterian approach actually enhances its 
appeal to policy makers as it is closer to the ground with more policy 
recommendations as against to that of the Solow model or its variant. 
Moreover, the research question just looks at necessary conditions which 
give us rooms to use the empirical approach of neo-Schumpeterian 
analysis, in contrast to the sufficient conditions that often associate with 
rigorous mathematical techniques41. 
(3)  Solow model is a mechanistic input-output model with capital, labour 
input modulated by TFP to generate economic growth. Though the 
breaking down of growth component into capital accumulation, labour 
accumulation and TFP gain are intellectually simple to grasp and indeed 
give succinct explanatory power of past growth performance. However, 
                                                            
41 The future path of economic growth is often unpredictable even under the most rigorous 
mathematical modelling. Many economists consider the future economic path simply cannot be 
model. neo-Schumpeterian school consider the economic system as an evolutionary biological 
system rather than a mechanistic physical system and it cannot be model on current state of 
knowledge.  
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we had noted that TFP is a residual and it is essentially a black box that 
leaves the question of what makes up the TFP gain unanswered. Using 
TFP in an ex-ante study is hard to justify as we discussed earlier. We also 
noted earlier that the TFP index construction relies on some elasticity 
parameter assumptions further complicate the matter. For a typical low 
income country whose growth depends mostly on factor accumulation 
and TFP is not an important driver, Solow model is still workable. 
However, in the case of China that has a high historical TFP gain with its 
economy increasingly relying on innovation to move forward, the 
ignorance of TFP will definitely affect the study. On the other hand, 
innovation centric neo-Schumpeterian theory is designed to analyse 
economic growth in a country that is moving up from a high-middle- 
income country to a high-income country, especially from a longer-term 
perspective. It encompasses many critical variables in economic growth 
in that transition, including institution, human resources, 
entrepreneurship and innovation. 
(4) Many Chinese scholars had identified the following factors behind the 
success of Chinese economic growth in the past: (1) Institutional reform 
that promote efficiency gain at micro-level and resources allocation, (2) 
Improved infrastructure, (3) Economic efficiency improvement through 
indigenous R&D and foreign technology adoption. These scholars also 
look at the following potential sources for continuing productivity 
growth in China: (1) Continuing institutional reform, (2) Emerging 
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entrepreneurship, (3) Increasing R&D-driven new innovations42,43. The 
Chinese government programs are designed to enhance the three 
potential sources of productivity growth. While Solow model does not 
look into those elements, these three sources of continuing productivity 
growth: Institutional reform, entrepreneurship and R&D driven 
innovation are all topics under neo-Schumpeterian framework of 
economic development.  Using neo-Schumpeterian framework to look 
into our research question is appropriate.  
(5) Chinese economy is transitioning from a high-middle income economy 
to a high-income one. Historically, out of 101 or so middle income 
economics in the 1960s, only about 13 (mostly in East Asia) had 
graduated to become high income economics by 2008. For the two East 
Asian countries since 1960 that had succeeded at such a rapid transition: 
South Korea and Taiwan. Their experiences have shown that innovation 
has played a key role in their successful transition to developed economy 
status. In some way, Chinese economy today is what these two countries 
are some years back. After a few decades of industrialization based on 
labour-intensive manufacturing, these two countries experienced labour 
shortages as well as losing comparative advantage for their 
manufacturing exports. They subsequently upgraded their industries, 
moved into higher value-added activities and became developed 
                                                            
42 Wong, J. (2007). China's Economic Growth in East Asian Context. In China's Surging 
Economy: Adjusting for More Balanced Development (pp. 31-54). Singapore: World Scientific 
Publishing Pte. Ltd. 
43 Liu, Z. (2002). The Nature and Sources of Economic Growth in China: Is There TFP Growth? 
In China's Economy into the New Century (pp. 43-62). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Pte. 
Ltd. 
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countries. China is now undergoing a similar economic transition. There 
are existing academic works using neo-Schumpeterian analysis to 
explain these countries’ success. We can follow some methodologies 
used in these earlier works and confident of the outcome of the study.  
(6) Earlier, we have discussed some generally-recognized policy 
recommendations based on neo-Schumpeterian economics. They provide 
some useful benchmark to test certain necessary conditions in this study.  
(7) The idea of a punctuated, disruptive, and innovation-based economic 
development in China makes mathematical data-based projections of 
economic growth unfeasible. However, neo-Schumpeterian Economics 
has developed some necessary conditions for economic development. 
These conditions fall under three levels: micro, meso and macro44. All 
three levels are required to work systematically together towards economic 
development.  
The micro-level encompasses human capital, entrepreneurial spirit, 
corporations that can provide entrepreneurship, and the innovation and 
execution capacity of firms. 
The meso-level encompasses available entry opportunities to higher value-
added activities for old industries, or available entry opportunities to gain 
access to new industries. 
The macro level encompasses a government’s effective acquisition of 
technology and stable macroeconomic policy. 
                                                            
44 Lee, K. (2013). Chapter 6 – Toward a knowledge-based theory of economic catch-up. In 
Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up. (pp. 127-146). Cambridge. 
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Choosing neo-Schumpeterian Analysis over New Structural Economics in the 
study 
An alternative model for Chinese economic growth was proposed by the 
former World Bank chief economist, Justin Lin. This model, the New Structural 
Economics, aims to explain the country’s economic growth by taking into account 
the reform-centric nature of China’s economic growth pattern, and its discontinuous 
and mathematically unfriendly nature. It emphasizes the empirical study of 
comparative advantage and government policy that set the institutional and 
economic structure for growth.  
New Structural Economics’ hypothesis is that a developing country can 
take advantage of its backwardness and its comparative advantage of cheap labour 
to adopt foreign technology and accelerate economic growth opportunity. The 
model recommends that a developing country should just look at its comparative 
advantage and follow the growth or industrial policy of its peer in the next income 
bracket.  
Empirical evidence suggests that New Structural Economics only applies 
to a country transitioning from a low-income to middle-income economy. In that 
transition, labour cost comparative advantage and foreign technologies are still 
around. When a country is moving from a high middle-income to high income status, 
rising wages and market competition from former providers of knowhow mean that 
the country must rely on indigenous innovation in its move to high value-added 
activities.  
Out of 101 countries that have become middle-economies since the 1960s, 
only 13 of them (mostly relatively small economies) became developed countries 
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by 2008. In East Asia, four “Little Dragons” - South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong 
and Singapore - successfully became developed economies. More than other 
countries, Taiwan and South Korea’s successful transitions resemble that of China’s. 
These two countries started in the 1960s at the low middle-income level, followed 
the export-orientation path during the initial stage, successfully move into high-
value, innovation-based industries in 1990s, and became high income countries.45   
In Korea, these high-value, innovation-based industries in 1990s are 
automobile, shipbuilding, steel, and consumer electronics. In Taiwan, they are 
semiconductors design and fabrication, PC, and IT. Both countries’ growth are 
innovation-based industrial growth.  
New Structural Economics and neo-Schumpeterian Economics are all 
empirically based studies. However, it is more relevant to use the neo-
Schumpeterian framework in our research study of necessary pre-conditions of 
success of the industrial plan, Made in China 2025.     
Research Question:  
Under its 4th Industrial Revolution plan, does China have the necessary pre-
conditions to transform into an innovation-driven economy? 
Relevance of Research Question: 
1. From approximately 10% in 2012, China’s economic growth rate has slowed 
down since then to around 7%. Aside from the headwind of global slowdown, 
China is facing structural transition issues in moving from a high middle-
                                                            
45 Lee, K. (2013). Introduction. Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up (pp.3-24). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge. 
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income country to high-income country. The government is pushing 
innovation to rejuvenate growth momentum. Hence, the research question is 
relevant to China’s objective. 
2. With close to 14% of global GDP in 2015, China contributed between 25% 
to 35% of annual global growth after the 2008 global financial crisis. Its 
importance to global growth is more than its share of the global economy, 
highlighting that it is an important driver of global economic growth. A 
dynamic Chinese economy has implications for other economies.  
3. An Industrial Revolution is a period of significant improvements in 
productivity and economic transformation. Past experiences have shown 
significant spill-over effects from successful innovators to peripheral ones. 
China is the top manufacturing country in the world and positive externalities 
for its trading partners from successful innovation in China can happen 
quickly. 
4. Every industrial revolution defines a new international economic order. 
Different countries adopt new technologies in neither the same way nor the 
same speed. Some will emerge leaders in the adoption process but some will 
lag behind. During the 1st Industrial Revolution, Great Britain emerged as 
the leading country. During the 2nd Industrial Revolution, the US came first, 
followed by Germany. During the 3rd Industrial Revolution which was based 
on digitization, the US again reinforced its global leadership position. Today, 
China is the most aggressive country in pushing innovation, and its success 
or failure in transforming its economy will have significant geo-political 
implications. 
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5. The research question looks into whether China can get the necessary pre-
conditions for transformation into an innovation-driven economy. This 
means that careful examination of these conditions is required. In the last 
decade, China had moved from a simple assembler type of exporter to a 
supplier of highly technical products such as telecommunication gear46. 
Many countries will like to look at these necessary conditions as they can 
serve as a valuable policy reference tool.  
Importance of the Research: 
 The research looks into whether China can get the necessary pre-conditions 
for success in its 4th Industrial Revolution Plan using neo-Schumpeterian Analysis. 
The conventional approach in studying economic growth problems is using the 
Solow model. To some Chinese economists, it is New Structural Economics. We 
argue that the proper framework to analyse such forward looking question should 
be neo-Schumpeterian. This change of perspective is very important in turning 
development economics into a forward looking science and that will be our 
contribution to the discipline. 
 Empirical historic evidence had shown that economic growth in developed 
countries is an industrial growth process. The ability to innovate and add more value 
to existing industries and to set up new high value-added industries, are the essence 
of the industrial growth process.  The search for a working model that can shed light 
on the industrialization process is always an academically challenging topic, and 
our research aims to add to the knowledge in this important area. The model 
                                                            
46 Fox, J. (2016, July 28). Huawei Conquers the World, Except the US. Retrieved July 28, 2016, 
from http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-26/huawei-conquers-the-world-except-
the-u-ses/2016-07-26/huawei-conquers-the-world-except-the-u-s 
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developed in this paper shows that industrial meso-level analysis using neo-
Schumpeterian framework can provide good predictive value on necessary pre-
conditions in the industrial growth process. The model could be useful for many 
scholars and policy makers and it is another contribution to the discipline of 
development economics. 
 It is noted that most of the economic growth programs in developing 
countries are essentially industrial growth programs. However, these programs are 
often top-down, taking consideration only from macro and some meso factors, with 
little attention to the micro-level pre-conditions for its success. The necessity of all 
the different elements in the three levels- is critical for the success of the industrial 
program. The research result in the paper highlights this important coordination 
issue and addresses an important gap in the current economic planning process.  
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review: 
 To properly understand our research question and the methodology applied 
in the thesis, this literature review focuses on three areas: some unique features of 
the Chinese economy, the 4th Industrial Revolution and China’s 4th Industrial 
Revolution Plan, and the neo-Schumpeterian framework of Development 
Economics. These three focuses provide the basis to understand the rationale behind 
the methodology in answering the research question.   
 The Chinese economic growth process does not quite fit into a textbook case 
and a review of its unique features will highlight the facts that the country was not 
a typical third world nation with little indigenous technology and innovation 
capacity when it started the economic reform in 1979. The Chinese economy had 
demonstrated high total factor productivity growth and speedy ascension in 
technology ladder as witnessed by its speedy growth in high technology world 
export market in the reform era. The scale of R&D spending is contrary to the 
conventional thinking that China is a simple copy-cat technology follower. In 
relation to our research question, we have shown that China has been persistently 
building up its capacities in the elements necessary for success at micro-, meso- and 
macro- levels in the economic development analysis under neo-Schumpeterian 
framework since the reform started in 1979. 
 The research question studies the necessary pre-conditions for 
implementing Made in China 2025. The idea of 4th Industrial Revolution was first 
mentioned in 2013 and China’s 4th Industrial Revolution plan, Made in China 2025, 
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appeared only in May 2015. Our discussion on these two topics will help in the 
proper understanding of our research question. 
 The third literature review focus on neo-Schumpeterian framework of 
Development Economics provides the necessary background information to 
understand the methodology used in the thesis.    
Some unique features of the Chinese Economy: 
1. In the past, a burst of economic activity always comes after institutional 
reforms. Understanding the Chinese economy requires an understanding of 
how its institutional framework affects economic development. The traditional 
approach of using trends of economic input factors to look at output alone does 
not work well, because the burst of economic activities makes the intensity and 
timing of economic development hard to predict. Hence, developing 
mathematical models on Chinese economic development is not easy, and many 
economists still prefer a descriptive approach.  
2. Given China’s well-documented sky-high savings and investment rates, one 
might think that capital deepening is the most important factor in economic 
development. Though capital accumulation is the key factor in the development 
process (fig 7 below), it is interesting to note that total factor productivity also 
contributed significantly to the growth process along the way, and that labour 
deepening was only important at the initial stage. China’s economic structure, 
with 30% of its economy in manufacturing and a significant portion destined 
for export, subjects itself to constant pressure on innovation in order to 
maintain its position as the “factory of the world”. 
 ‐ 40 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
 
Fig 7. Accounting for China’s growth47  
3. Based on empirical observations, many traditional economic theories on 
technology and investment migration - such as the “Flying Geese Model” and 
the “Industry Life Cycle” – do not work for China. Besides the popular 
explanation that a good ecosystem somehow ameliorates rising wages and 
causes migration towards the interior rather than abroad, the productivity drive 
at the micro-firm level should not be overlooked. Fig 8 below shows that even 
as Chinese manufacturing developed to encompass new high-tech, value-added 
activities such as telecommunications equipment as well as traditional higher 
value-added activities such as automotive components and chemicals, Chinese 
firms maintained their global export market shares in textile and clothing. 
Exporting as the “factory of the world” exposes Chinese manufacturers to 
global competition, and their ability to maintain their market share indicates 
                                                            
47 Liu, Z. (2015). Is China’s Growth Miracle Over? Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco 
Economic Letter. Retrieved from http://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-
letter/2015/august/china-economic-growth-miracle-slowdown/  
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that their productivity must be constantly adjusting to the global cost structure. 
The huge domestic market, large population and skill pool allow multiple 
economic engines to work at the same time, subject to less input constraints. 
 
Fig 8. China’s export data (WTO database and author’s calculation)48  
 
4. As indicated in fig 3, China’s share of the export and import trade on goods as 
a percentage of GDP peaked at 64.5% in 2006. This dropped to 41.5% in 2014 
and is still decreasing. The re-orientation of the economy to a more domestic 
one benefits the initial phase of an innovation economy, as the domestic market 
is generally more assured for new products. Government purchases are often 
the best way to nurture innovation. 
                                                            
48 World Trade Organization. Time series – Subject selection. Retrieved from 
http://stat.wto.org/StatisticalProgram/WSDBStatProgramSeries.aspx?Language=E  
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5. The World Bank’s records show that China’s high-tech exports have increased 
consistently throughout the year. This can be seen in fig 9 below. 
 
Fig 9. High-technology exports (5 of manufactured exports) and High-technology 
exports (current US$)49  
Moreover, the latest release of data for Trade in Value Added (TiVA) shows 
that China is also the leading source of value-added manufacturing (fig 10). The 
percentage gap between its gross export share of global trade and domestic value-
added in foreign final demand is rather close, indicating significant local content 
for its manufacturing export. This indicates that China has graduated from a mere 
export-processing type of manufacturing with significant raw materials, parts and 
components sourced from overseas to more indigenous technology-based exports.  
                                                            
49 The World Bank. (2016).  High-technology exports (current US$). Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.CD/countries/CN?page=4&display=default 
The World Bank. (2016). High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports). Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.MF.ZS/countries/CN?page=4&display=defaul
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Fig10. Top 10 suppliers of manufactured goods on gross export and value-added 
terms (2011)50 
6. In terms of per capita income, China belongs to the high middle-income 
category and is definitely a developing country. However, its enormous spending 
on R&D often puts it on the technological frontier. Fig 11 shows that China was the 
second biggest spender on R&D in 2013, spending USD 318 billion in constant 
2010 USD-constant prices and PPP terms compared to the US’ spending of USD 
433 billion. In this context, China might possess more technological prowess than 
commonly thought. The key to translating R&D results into economic development 
lies in the entrepreneurship that will facilitate the 
commercialization of innovations.  
                                                            
50 OECD. (2015). Top 20 International suppliers of manufactured goods in gross export and value 
added terms, 2011. Percentage shares of total world manufactured goods. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933273121 
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Fig 11. R&D in OECD and key partner countries, 201351 
 
4th Industrial Revolution & China’s 4th Industrial Revolution Plan 
 The concept of the 4th Industrial Revolution started from an initiative called 
Industry 4.0 to promote the competitiveness of German manufacturing industries. 
It was unveiled during the 2011 Hannover Fair by a group of German business and 
academic leaders. At the 2013 Hannover Fair, the German government officially 
                                                            
51 OECD. (2015). R&D in OECD and key partner countries, 2013. OECD, Main Science and 
Technology Indicators Database. Retrieved from www.oecd.org/sti/msti.htm and UNESCO 
Institute for Statistics, June 2015. 
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adopted the group’s report Industry 4.0 Strategy Proposal as a blueprint for 
industrial development. The idea received worldwide attention and many 
governments subsequently adopted similar industrial development plans: New 
Industrial France (2013); National Network for Manufacturing Innovation of the 
US (2013); the White Paper for Manufacturing of Japan (2014); British 
Manufacturing 2050 (2015); Innovation in Manufacturing 3.0 of South Korea; and 
Made in China 2025 (2015).  
The aim of Industry 4.0 is to bring together a collection of technologies and 
concepts of value chain organization to build a smart manufacturing system, i.e. 
applying the tools of information technology to production. This primarily means 
using the cyber-physical system, Internet of Things (IoT) and the Internet of Service, 
to better integrate small and medium-sized German companies into global 
production and innovations via smart IT infrastructure.  
Industrial Revolution (IR) refers to the totality of changes in economic and 
social conditions caused by a change in the technologies underlying the economy 
at that time. It is marked by a burst of general purpose technologies (GPTs), which 
are transformational technologies that carry new, deep ideas or techniques that can 
benefit a good number of industries.  GPTs can sharply boost the productivity of an 
economy, and their emergence and convergence indicate that an industrial 
revolution is a period of intense creative destruction.  
A good definition of IR is proposed by Nicolas Davis, Head of Security and 
Innovation at the World Economic Forum. He uses improvements in automation 
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and connectivity to describe each IR52. The four industrial revolutions are shown in 
fig 12, and their descriptions are provided below. 
Fig 12. The four industrial revolutions53 
In lieu of animal power, the first IR introduced early automation through 
machinery. Mechanization became a key element of economic development, and 
steam power and the locomotive revolutionized travel and improved physical 
connectivity.  
The second IR was characterized by three factors: a higher level of 
automation via mass production; more efficient connectivity in production through 
the division of labour; and new energy sources such as electricity and oil. The 
second IR heralded standardization, the global supply chain and the modern 
corporation. 
                                                            
52 Baweja, B., Donovan P., Haefele, M., Siddiqi, L., & Smiles, S. (2016). Extreme Automation & 
Connectivity: The Global, Regional & Investment Implications of the 4th Industrial Revolution 
(Publication). UBS.  
53 Roser, C. Industry 4.0 The four industrial revolutions. Retrieved from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industry_4.0 
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The third IR was marked by digitization. The scope of automation was 
enhanced by the exponential growth of computing power that can automate 
complicated tasks, and connectivity among people improved with the Internet. 
The shape of the fourth IR is yet to come, but there are already signs that 
artificial intelligence and wireless telecommunication will be the key GPT. Extreme 
automation will expand the jobs that machines can handle, robots will increasingly 
take over jobs that only humans can do, and instantaneous wireless communication 
will allow remote control of many operations.   
The idea of industrial revolution is an expansion of Industry 4.0 and involves 
other aspects aside from manufacturing technologies. The various industrial 
development plans by the countries mentioned above (France, the US, Japan, the 
UK) concentrated on manufacturing but not on machine-labour substitution. Except 
for China, all nations that planned for the Fourth Industrial Revolution are 
developed countries.  
The 4th Industrial Revolution implementation plan - Made in China 2025 - 
is a top-level design roadmap to transform Chinese industries characterized as just 
being large to ones that emphasize overall leadership. The official start-up 
document was released by the State Council in May 2015, and a detailed 
technological roadmap (Green Book) was released in October54. This plan is the 
                                                            
54  The  Chinese  government  normally  published  its  regular  five‐year  plan  as  white  paper  with 
technological roadmap treated as an appendix of the white paper. In the case of Made in China 
2025, the original document promulgated in May 2015 by the State Council was dubbed the White 
Book, and the technological roadmap published in Oct 2015 was dubbed the Green Book on the 
insistence of  the Prime Minister as  the cover of  the 184 pages  long report  is colour green. The 
Prime Minister used the term Green Book to emphasize the point that the technological roadmap 
is formulated not by bureaucrats but scientist and industry players and unusually detailed. Chinese 
Academy of Engineering set up a regular office to monitor the progress and it  is going to make 
biannual amendment to reflect new technological changes. Made in China 2025  is a technology 
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first part of a 30-year project to improve China’s global industrial leadership. The 
official document mentioned some broad targets for innovation, manufacturing 
efficiency, digitization and green economics. The Green Book is more specific and 
contains a roadmap for development for 10 key industrial sectors. The key sectors 
under Made in China 2025 contain a good number of manufacturing sectors that 
properly belong to the Industry 2.0 and Industry 3.0 eras.  
 In a way, we can say that China is embarking on a road from Industry 2.0 
to 4.0 under Made in China 2025, while at the same time filling some technological 
gaps between 2.0 and 3.0. 
 Made in China 2025 is wider in scope than all other countries' 4th Industrial 
Revolution plans, and it differs from the other plans in three key aspects:  
1. It focuses on the entire manufacturing process and not just key 
innovations;  
2. It promotes the development of not only advanced industries, but also 
traditional industries; 
3. The plan is industry-based, with extensive participation by academics and 
research institutes. 48 academicians from the Academy of Science and 
Engineering, and more than 400 specialists from industry and academia 
participated in the drafting of the plan. The plan is subject to biannual 
review and evaluation, and the degree of high-level participation is 
unprecedented.  
                                                            
innovation centric industrial policy plan and it is the first time that the term Green Book is used in 
China. 
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 Made in China 2025 is more than an industrial development plan based on 
technology innovation. According to President Xi Jinping, “we must…, implement 
the Made in China 2025 vision, …  to build a world-class manufacturing power, to 
provide strong strategic support for the realization of China great rejuvenation”55. 
The plan, made in China 2025, is a long term strategic economic development plan 
that is an integral part of a long term national development plan. The idea is to turn 
China from a manufacturing giant to an innovation giant. The popular slogan is to 
turn the Chinese goods from “Made in China” to “Created in China”56.  Some broad 
targets on national innovation, manufacturing efficiency, digitization and green 
economics are mentioned. The advantage of being a strategic economic 
development plan over a technology innovation plan is the availability of more 
social resources to support the plan. Made in China 2025 identifies 10 key industrial 
sectors with some sub-sectors as follows:  
1. Advanced Information Technology - integrated circuit fabrication; 
communication equipment; operating systems and embedded industrial 
software; smart manufacturing network; 
2. Computerized numerical machine tools and robotics - advanced machine 
tool manufacturing; robots; 
3. Aerospace and Aeronautical Equipment - airplanes; jet engines; 
aerospace equipment and systems; new space equipment; 
4. Maritime equipment and high tech vessels; 
5. Modern rail equipment; 
                                                            
55 Miao, W. (2015, July 10). Made in China 2025, the road towards the manufacture power. 
Retrieved September 8, 2016, from http://www.donghechina.com/news_detail/newsId=25.html 
56 Ibid. 
 ‐ 50 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
6. New energy vehicles and equipment - new energy vehicles; energy saving 
cars; smart internet connected cars; 
7. Power equipment - power plant equipment; transmission equipment; 
8. Agricultural equipment; 
9. New material - high-tech basic material; strategic material; advanced new 
material;  
10. Biopharmaceuticals and advanced medical devices - biopharma; high tech 
medical devices. 
China is one of the few countries in the world that still maintains official 5-
year plans. However, Made in China 2025 is different from earlier state-
mandated 5-year plans in several key aspects:  
1. There is still a focus on state involvement in funding and financing 
support, but market mechanisms and globalized technological exchange 
have become more prominent. One of the most important policy changes 
is technical standards. Instead of focusing on unique domestic technical 
standards, the attention is on self-declared standards by enterprises and 
the international standards system.  
2. The Green Book technological roadmap for the 10 key industries is 
comprehensive, flexible and detailed. Targets set in the Green Book are 
based on China’s current technological learning base and are very 
pragmatic. 
3. The Green Book roadmap normally contains the following sections: 
market potential, objectives, key products, key technologies, showcase 
project, and strategic support required. Some reports also contain key 
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complementary technologies and products required. Interestingly, there 
are actually three time frames: 2020, 2025 and 2030. For technologies 
such as telecommunications where China is known as the leader, the 
guide post is set at 2020 and 2025, while for sectors such as 
semiconductor fabrication where China is considered lagging behind, the 
guide post is set at 2020, 2025 and 2030. This difference is apparently set 
to allow more learning time for the slower sector.   
Neo-Schumpeterian Framework of Development Economics 
Joseph Alois Schumpeter (1883-1950) was an Austrian-born American 
economist and political scientist famous for coining the term “creative destruction”. 
This theory on economic development was not popular during his time, but it has 
gained attention in the last three decades following the emergence of new high-tech 
industries as the driver of economic development.  
During the mid-1990s, the concurrent rise of a new, technology-driven 
economy in the US and the stagnation of other G7 countries like Europe and Japan 
revived the interest of both policy makers and academics in Schumpeterian 
innovation-based economics. The US’ superior economic performance from the 
mid-1990s till the present, compared to other advanced G7 economies, is attributed 
to the concentration of technological innovation in the US57. Its subpar economic 
recovery after the 2008 global financial crisis pushed more and more advanced 
                                                            
57 Furman, J., & Shambaugh, J., (2016). Chapter 5 – Technology & Innovation. In S. Black (Ed.), 
Economic Report of the President – together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic 
Advisors (pp. 207-250). Doi: https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/economic-report-of-
the-President/2016  
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countries to look at innovation- driven improvements in productivity as an alternate 
solution to stimulate demand and jumpstart their economies. The most popular 
recommendations were structural reforms to increase productivity of the underlying 
economy and pursuing innovation to improve productivity, which are essentially 
variants of neo-Schumpeterian schools. Prominent economists Larry Summers and 
Brad Delong declared the 21st century to be an age of Schumpeter studies58.  
Schumpeter’s innovation-driven view of economic development has a huge 
following in business schools. His concept of “creative destruction” is one of the 
central ideas in most business schools’ courses on innovation. Another central idea 
of Schumpeterian economics, “entrepreneurship”, has evolved into one of the 
pillars in most business schools as well.  
Technological innovation is a driver of economic development. Under 
Schumpeterian economics, the modern economy is always in a dynamic state of 
disequilibrium that is growing and changing all the time. It makes structural change 
the central problem of economics. Schumpeter posited that innovation, the 
entrepreneurship that moves resources from old and obsolete to new and more 
productive employments, is the very essence of modern economics. Schumpeter’s 
economics is a study in innovation dynamics. 
In Schumpeter’s mind, the economy is in an initial state of stasis with a cyclical 
flow between the household and firms in a typical two-factor economy. This is 
illustrated in Fig. 6 earlier. An aspiring entrepreneur inspired by new ideas or 
                                                            
58 Roberts, R. (2007). PERMANENT LINK | October 8,2007 McCraw on Schumpeter, Innovation, 
and Creative Destruction [Podcast]/ Library of Economics & Liberty. Retrieved from 
http://files.libertyfund.org/econtalk/y2007/Mccrawinnovation.mp3 6:24 -6:30 
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products comes into picture and introduces innovation into the economy. This move 
triggers economic development. The economy in turn rewards the entrepreneur 
with handsome profits and it will last until imitators come in and drive the margins 
down to its former state of stasis. The economy will experience a boom when 
innovation comes in, and a return to stasis or bust when new innovation dries up 
and old innovations wear out. Innovation is the cause of both economic 
development and cyclical instability.  
Schumpeter maintained that innovations tend to cluster around certain points 
in time – what he called the “neighborhood of equilibrium”. The burst of 
entrepreneurial activities is the period when entrepreneurs perceive risks, and 
potential returns warrant a commitment to innovation. An industrial revolution is a 
period when many new general purpose technologies appear and it is also typically 
a period of massive “creative destruction”.   
Innovation also means “creative destruction”. The obsolescence of old 
equipment or investment means more new capital is needed. The economy then 
calls for capital formation and improvements in productivity to maintain its wealth-
producing capacity. In a Schumpeterian development economy, only the innovator 
makes a genuine “profit” that is needed to maintain the capital formation required 
by the economy. This necessity of “profit” to maintain economic development is 
different from both classical and Marxist economics. Schumpeterian economics 
provide a moral ground for “profit”. So one of its basic questions is: “Is there 
sufficient profit for adequate capital formation to handle creative destruction and 
provide for the future?” 
Innovation drives the Schumpeterian economy.  
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      The goal of economic policy should be the promotion of higher productivity 
through greater innovation, and modulating business cycles or economic 
fluctuations should take innovation cycles into account. Schumpeterian innovation 
areas are broad, and new things, or continual improvement, or the recombination of 
old things that can improve economic outcome are defined as innovation. More 
specifically, he defined innovation as: 
 Introduction of new products; 
 Introduction of new production methods; 
 Opening up of new markets; 
 Opening up of new sources of raw material; 
 New organizational forms in any industry that improve economic 
outcome.  
The entrepreneur is the agent of economic development.  
      Schumpeter maintained that invention and the implementation of innovation are 
two different things. Inventions or ideas that do not materialize are irrelevant. 
The entrepreneur is at the center of innovation. He is motivated by: 
 The desire to build a private commercial kingdom; 
 The will to conquer and prove his superiority; 
 The joy of creating, of getting things done, or simply exercising one’s 
energy and ingenuity. 
An entrepreneur also requires two things to perform his role: 
 The existence of technological knowhow in order to produce innovation; 
 The power of disposal over the factors of production, in particular credit, 
in the implementation stage. 
 ‐ 55 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
Industry and firm competence is a platform for economic development.         
Schumpeter came to see entrepreneurship as a function that could be performed by 
a team or a corporation, not necessarily by an individual. He claimed that large 
corporate forms of organization are drivers of economic development, and he 
thought that any kind of organizational change could be an important factor in 
economic development. 
Schumpeter’s distinction between invention and innovation demonstrates the 
pragmatic dimension of his thinking. His emphasis on entrepreneurs is in essence 
an emphasis on implementation over pure ideas. His designation of the corporation 
as an effective agent of entrepreneurship shows his unconventional thinking, as 
popular academic thinking at that time associated corporations with monopoly. 
Schumpeterian economics differs from other schools in its emphasis on the 
platforms of implementation, be they entrepreneurs, firms or industry. This 
platform specific approach allows more focus on policy design and closer 
supervision of implementation. 
Neo-Schumpeterian development economics 
Economic conditions when Schumpeter passed away in 1950 were very 
different from today. The vertical corporation model that built up US industrial 
structures in the early 20th century was replaced by a combination of the dynamic 
start-up, declining numbers of small- and medium-sized manufacturing firms and 
giant multinational manufacturers working under the global value chain59.   
                                                            
59 Berger, S., & MIT Task Force (2013). Production in the Innovation Economy. Making in 
America: From Innovation to Market. MIT Press. 
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There are many meaningful additions to Schumpeter’s original ideas, and neo-
Schumpeterian economics is a synthesis of his original ideas and the infusion of 
ideas from evolutionary economics, complexity economics, the study of industries’ 
life cycles, and systems theory60:  
 Evolutionary economics emphasizes path dependency and irreversible 
events. To study the driving forces behind the emergence and diffusion 
of innovation, we must understand how heterogeneous rational actors 
learn by trial and error in uncertain environments to innovate. The 
outcome of evolutionary processes can neither be determined in an ex-
ante way nor from the standpoint of global optimization. The economic 
system resembles an evolutionary biological system and not a 
mechanistic physical system. 
 Complexity economics emphasizes the interaction between agents in 
knowledge generation and diffusion processes. The world is inherently 
complex, nonlinear and unpredictable, much more so in the area of 
innovation. 
 Studying the industrial life cycle complements the application of neo-
Schumpeterian economics in the setting of industrial development 
policy. It provides the idea of creative accumulation for mature 
industries in opposition to the creative destruction of new industries. 
 Systems Theory provides the basis for studying the interaction of 
different economic actors in the innovation process: firms, universities, 
                                                            
60 Hanusch, H. & Pyka, A. (2007). Principles of neo-Schumpeterian Economics. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 31(2007), 275-289. 
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and public research laboratories. It also enables the study of the 
institutional frameworks and governance structures that shape the 
innovation process in national, sectoral, regional and corporate 
innovation systems. Popular ideas such as the innovation cluster fall 
under systems theory. 
In a nutshell, the neo-Schumpeterian Economics combines the original 
Schumpeterian idea of innovation driven economic growth with subsequent 
contributions from other disciplines. It deals with dynamic processes that transform 
an economy through the introduction of innovation in different forms.  
Policy recommendations from neo-Schumpeterian Economics on economic 
development are generally61: 
 Emphasis on the creation, diffusion and transformation of knowledge 
into innovation; 
 Removal of constraints that inhibit economic factors of production from 
reaching their full potential under the status quo, and allowing these 
factors to develop under new circumstances; 
 Qualitative changes to the economy happen in a punctuated fashion, 
and policy flexibility is needed to handle both stable regular periods 
and radical changing times; 
 The dynamic growth process shows a strong non-linearity and positive 
feedback effect. Though the process is not easy to model, it does show 
                                                            
61 Lee, K. (2013). Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge.  
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a certain pattern and some form of structure. It is not completely erratic; 
even innovation is characterized by strong uncertainty. 
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Chapter 3 - Research Methodology  
 
To answer our research question, “Does China have the necessary pre-
conditions for its transformation into an innovation-driven economy under its 4th 
industrial revolution plan?”, we will use the three level neo-Schumpeterian 
analysis framework to examine whether China possesses those necessary pre-
conditions to succeed in all the three levels under the framework for its Made in 
China 2025 plan. The three level analysis at the micro-level, meso-level and macro-
level are the standard methodologies today in the discipline 62. 
Using three level neo-Schumpeterian analysis to study innovation-driven 
economic growth: 
The micro-level analysis refers to the basic human and firm base innovation 
capacity available in the society. At the micro-level, we examine human resources 
that complement entrepreneurs to form the knowledge base of firms. The learning 
and innovation capacities of the firm are the keys here. The idea of knowledge-
based theory of production makes innovation a problem-solving activity and draws 
upon knowledge bases that are stored in firms’ routines63. 
The meso-level refers to industrial level analysis and focuses on the 
challenges facing the establishment of a new high value-added industry or 
migrating to higher value-added activities in an existing industry. At the meso-level, 
we use the idea of the technological regime to define the particular situation which 
                                                            
62 Lee, K. (2013). Chapter 6 – Toward a knowledge-based theory of economic catch-up. In 
Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up (pp. 127-146). Cambridge.  
63 Grant, R. (1996). Knowledge based theory of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 
1996(17),109. Retrieved from 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Robert_Grant12/publication/229100915_Toward_a_Knowled
ge-Based_Theory_of_the_Firm/links/54da315a0cf24647582106cd.pdf.  
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a firm or an industry must tackle when it works on a particular technology. A 
technological regime puts a constraint on the pattern of emerging innovation in an 
industry. It is defined as a particular combination of four key factors: technological 
opportunities, appropriability, the accumulation of technical advances, and the 
property of the knowledge base. 
 Technological opportunity refers to the extent a technological sector 
can draw relevant technological information from the knowledge base. 
The knowledge base can be in-house or from outside sources such as 
the technologies of suppliers or customers, or works by universities or 
research institutes. It indicates the likelihood of successful innovation 
for an investment. High opportunities provide powerful incentives for 
innovative activities and are indications of an environment that is not 
functionally constrained by scarcity. In the case of China, it means how 
likely China is to acquire the necessary technologies in the industry, 
either through indigenous technological breakthroughs or from foreign 
sources.  
 Appropriability refers to the ability of the owner of a resource to receive 
a return equal to the value created by that resource. It indicates the 
possibility of protecting innovations from imitations. Possible devices 
of appropriability in the context of technological regimes are patents, 
the learning curve effect, differential technological efficiency due to the 
scale effect, and lead time. In China’s case, it means how the reward 
opportunities in the target industry are like. 
 Cumulativeness relates to the cognitive nature of the learning process 
(e.g. tacit knowledge, learning by doing). It reflects the extent of 
 ‐ 61 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
dependence of today’s innovation on past innovation. For China, it 
means how important accumulated knowledge is to current innovation 
efforts. 
 The property of the knowledge base refers to the level of specificity of 
the knowledge required, whether universal and widely applicable, or 
specific to one area.  It is important in the learning curve of a particular 
product or process. In the case of China, it means the kind of knowledge 
base needed for the current innovations in a particular industry. Is it a 
very broad general knowledge type which requires a lot of 
complementary technologies in order to put an innovation to use? Or is 
it a very specific area, in which once a particular breakthrough is 
achieved, innovation is done?  
These four factors constituting the technological regime are the major ones, 
and there are other factors such as: relative cycle time (speed of obsolescence of 
knowledge), accessibility of external knowledge flows, initial stock of accumulated 
knowledge, and the uncertainty (fluidity) of technology’s trajectory. How one 
define a technological regime really depends on the industry at hand64. 
  Technological regimes play a major role in determining the specific pattern 
of innovation of an industry across countries. Through the major constraints 
identified by technological regimes, we can identify why some late comer countries 
succeed in catching up in some industries but failing in other industries. It 
determines the pattern of innovation for specific technological classes.  
                                                            
64 Park, K. (2006). Linking the Technological regime to the Technological Catch-up: Analysing 
Korea and Taiwan using the US patent Data. Industrial & Corporate Changes, 16(4). Retrieved 
from 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Keun_Lee10/publication/5212589_Linking_the_technologica
l_regime_to_the_technological_catch- 
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The macro-level refers to government policies and actions that enhance the 
availability of the elements at the micro- and meso- level necessary for innovation 
to prosper. We will look at the government industrial and innovation policies at this 
level. 
The technological and innovation capacities of states are the drivers of 
economic development for high-middle income and high income countries. We will 
study human capital and entrepreneurship at the micro-level, industrial catch-up 
using the technological regime at the meso-level, and government policies at the 
macro level to examine the potential of innovation to meaningfully contribute to 
China’s economic development.  These three levels complement each other and 
must work in tandem to provide the necessary pre-conditions for a country’s 
success in setting up a new industry and use that industry to move the economic 
development forward. 
Elements at the three level neo-Schumpeterian analysis: 
At the micro-level – we use the following elements that push an innovation-
type economy: 
 Human capital - tertiary enrolment figures, R & D personnel 
numbers and budget, annual publication figures of scientific 
papers65; 
 Entrepreneurial spirit - a common proxy used is business formation66;  
                                                            
65 Fiscal Policies for Innovation & Growth. (2016). In Fiscal Monitor Spring 2016 (pp. 29-50). 
Washington, DC: IMF. Retrieved from 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2016/01.fmindex.htm  
66 Furman, J., & Shambaugh, J. (2016). Chapter 5 – Technology & Innovation. In S. Black (Ed.), 
Economic Report of the President – together with the Annual Report of the Council of Economic 
Advisors (pp. 207-250). Retrieved from 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/cea/economic-f-report-of-the-President/2016  
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 Corporations that can provide entrepreneurship – the size of a firm 
is positively correlated to its absorptive or innovative competence in 
the case of “creative accumulation” sectors. These sectors are the 
most prevalent sectors in the economy rather than “creative 
destruction” sectors. The increasing size of large corporations and 
the increasing trend of patent filings prove these points. Higher 
levels of manufacturing value also demonstrate corporate technical 
strengths67. In an Asian setting, giant corporations also push creative 
destruction-type innovation. 
 Innovation capacity - to prove that there is a micro-level indigenous 
capability to innovate, we show that the patent holdings of domestic 
firms are increasingly dominant over foreign firms, and business 
patent activities are increasingly dominant over that of individual’s68.      
There are a number of good secondary databases regarding these elements 
and we will use them in the analysis. We will also use published patent application 
information from the World Intellectual Property Organization’s (WIPO) Patent 
Cooperation Treaty (PCT) to identify Chinese technological leadership in 35 
technological fields.  
At the meso-level - to check the available entry opportunities to higher 
value-added activities in old industries or to gain entry to new industries, we use 
the technological regime framework. 
                                                            
67 Lee, K. (2013). Chapter 8 – Catching up and leapfrogging in China & India. In Schumpeterian 
Analysis of Economic Catch-up (pp. 178-201). Cambridge. 
68 Ibid. 
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The technological regime as a framework comprises of four criteria: 
technological opportunities; appropriability; the cumulativeness of knowledge; and 
the knowledge base.  We use them to study the pattern of innovation in the Chinese 
high speed rail industry and develop a technology and market innovation model69.  
This approach emphasizes the role of technological learning and the 
absorptive capacity of the learner in the dynamics of industrial upgrading. This is 
in sharp contrast to the conventional economic return base theory of the industry 
life cycle. The industry life cycle theory posits that as a technology ages and loses 
its formerly high margin, it will automatically migrate to new comers who are 
willing to work at a lower margin. We have noted the persistence of technological 
leadership in certain industries, such as German machinery industries which operate 
on lean margins. This approach is the dominant approach now used in neo-
Schumpeterian analysis on sectoral innovation. 
Our application of the technological regime follows that of Rho in his 
analysis of China’s semiconductor industry and that of Mu in her analysis of the 
Chinese automobile and telecommunication sectors 70 , 71 . We also use the 
                                                            
69 Breschi, S., Malerba, F., & Orsenigo, L. (2000). Technological Regimes & Schumpeterian 
Patterns of Innovation. The Economic Journal, 110, 388-410.  
70 Rho, S., Lee, K., & Kim, S. (2015). Limited Catch-Up in China's Semiconductor Industry: A 
Sectoral Innovation System Perspective. Millennial Asia, 6(2), 1-29. 
71 Mu, Q., & Lee, K. (2005). Knowledge diffusion, market segmentation and technological catch-
up: The case of the telecommunication industry in China Research Policy, 34, 759-783. Retrieved 
from http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0048733305000946/1-s2.0-S0048733305000946-
main.pdf?_tid=a799789e-0a97-11e6-bdf3-
00000aacb361&acdnat=1461555895_22ed320f5c27866d3e3488f55519fddb   
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information drawn from Made in China 2025’s Technological Roadmap (The 
Green Book)72. 
We will use the framework of the technological regime to look at one of the 
industry in Made in China 2025- modern rail equipment. The high speed rail 
industry development story in China demonstrated the pattern of innovations in the 
building up of a technologically challenging industry. We have developed a model 
on the technology and market innovation on high speed rail in China. This model 
can serve as a guide post to future studies of success pre-conditions of an industry. 
The real dynamics of innovation occurs at the industrial level. Information 
from the PCT complements the stated information in the Green Book and helps us 
to answer the research question. 
At the macro-level, we look at various technological acquisition schemes of 
the government and their support to the industry at the meso-level on its quest for 
appropriability, cumulativeness and acquisition of proper knowledge base in 
building the new industries. The government also plays a critical role in fostering 
the human capital base and entrepreneurship micro foundation.   
Expected outcome in the findings at three levels of neo-Schumpeterian analysis: 
 To use neo-Schumpeterian analysis to answer the research question: 
“Under its 4th Industrial Revolution plan, does China have the necessary pre-
conditions to transform into an innovation-driven economy?”, we look at whether 
                                                            
72 China Strategic Industry Council 国家制造强国建设战略咨询委员会 (2015). Technology Map 
for Made in China 2025《中国制造 2025》重点领域技术路线图 (pp. 1-184, Publication). 北京: 
国家制造强国建设战略咨询委员会.  
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China possesses the necessary elements for the success of innovations at the three 
levels of analysis. 
At the micro-level, does the country possess the required four elements of 
human capital and its related output, entrepreneurial spirit, corporate 
entrepreneurship, innovation and execution capacity of innovators. These elements 
form the basic innovation capacity of the country. The findings at the micro-level 
will be presented in Chapter 4.  
At the meso-level, we study the industrial development case on one of the 
ten industries under Made in China 2025- the high speed rail (HSR) industry. We   
develop a model on technology and market innovation on HSR in China based on 
neo-Schumpeterian framework. We look at whether the model remain valid today 
under different sets of economic conditions. The validity of the model provides the 
pre-conditions to succeed in the Made in China 2025. 
The findings at the meso-level will be presented in Chapter 5- Research 
Findings at the meso-level of neo-Schumpeterian Analysis. 
At the macro level, we will look at the overall government efforts in 
promoting national capacity building at the micro-level and promote industrial 
policies setting at the meso-level. An active government in these two areas is the 
pre-condition of success at the macro-level for neo-Schumpeterian analysis.   
The findings at the macro level will be presented in Chapter 6-Research 
Findings at the macro-level of neo-Schumpeterian Analysis. 
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The elements at the three levels of analysis must work together to deliver a 
good outcome. They are interacting in a dynamic way and the missing of any single 
element in the elements will adversely affect the answer to our research question.  
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Chapter 4 - Research Findings at the micro-level of neo-Schumpeterian 
analysis 
 This chapter reports the findings on China’s progress in the four areas of 
human capital and its output, entrepreneurial spirit, corporate entrepreneurship, 
innovation and execution capacity of innovators under the meso-level analysis. 
According to the neo-Schumpeterian analysis, these micro-level elements needs to 
be in place for a country to become an innovation driven economy. The objective 
of this chapter is to examine the state of China’s micro factors, and provide an 
assessment as to their adequacy by evaluating them against the performance of 
other economies.   
Introduction to Findings: 
 The three levels of analysis provide an integral framework to evaluate 
whether China possesses the necessary pre-conditions to succeed in its Made in 
China 2025 plan under neo-Schumpeterian analysis. The micro-level provides  
national innovation capacity, the meso-level turns the available innovation capacity 
to tangible products under the favourable macro-level industrial economic 
environment.  The three-level analysis are related and they must work together in 
answering the research question. We will discuss the micro-level findings in this 
chapter and analyse meso-level in chapter five and macro level in chapter 6.  
There are four elements in the micro-level analysis and they provide the 
foundation in building the innovation capacity of a country. We look at the 
following four elements in the evaluation of a country’s innovation capacity at 
micro-level. 
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    The first element - human capital and its related output provides the  
foundation for innovation potential of a country. There are several parameters used 
in gauging this element. The first parameter is tertiary enrolment. It is a parameter 
used to estimate the potential size of human resources pool that can meaningfully 
contribute to innovation driven economy. The second parameter is the number of 
scientific researchers & research budgets. This parameter serves as a good proxy 
on the potential of innovation output. The third parameter is the number of returning 
overseas talent. This is a new parameter that was introduced in recent years with 
the increasing mobility of top rated research talents. It represents the attractiveness 
of domestic R&D environment to high calibre science talent. In the thesis, we use 
the international net flows of scientific authors complied by OECD as the proxy. 
The fourth parameter is the number of scientific and technical journal publications.  
This is a good indicator of innovation output. The fifth parameter is the quality of 
scientific research output as measured by the country’s scientific publication in top 
citation tier in their respective fields.     
 The second element-entrepreneurial spirit is represented by business 
formation data. This represents the potential pool of motivated entrepreneurs to turn 
innovations into business success.  
 The third element- corporate entrepreneurship is represented by the trend of 
increasing corporation size as measured by sales. Anecdotally, neo-Schumpeterian 
economists have noted that there is a paradox in the patent arena since the 1980s. 
While the percentage of patents going to new start-up is increasing. The 
concentration of patents in terms of number of patent on the hand of giant 
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corporation also increases. There is a hollowing out at the middle ground 73 .  
Anecdotally, we can explain the phenomenon by noting that start-up is always good 
at innovation as their formation is often related to the emergence of new technology. 
The 1980s herald in a period of high-tech innovation. While in the case of the large 
corporations, their management have realized that R&D are necessary investment 
in keeping up their dominance in the industry. These two factors are clearly absent 
in the medium size business. Corporation is an important element in the innovation 
landscape of a country and increasing sales is often a good precursor to increasing 
R&D spending and innovation. Under Made in China 2025, the Chinese 
government mandated that large manufacturers must increase R&D spending from 
0.95% in 2015 to 1.26% in 2020 and 1.68% in 2025. The government also mandated 
that large manufacturers’ patent numbers must increase from 0.44 per RMB 100m 
of sales in 2015 to 0.70 in 2020 and 1.10 in 2025. Corporations are important agents 
in turning innovation to economic growth and Chinese government is pushing the 
large corporation to increase their commitment to R&D and innovation. 
 The fourth element- innovation and execution capacity of innovators are 
analysis using patent data. The gauge of a country’s innovation power and potential 
monetizing power of innovation are represented by its increasing patent portfolio 
in both domestic and international PCT filing, increasing business holding of 
patents over individuals, and its position in key patent areas as compared to other 
peer countries.    
Micro-level analysis: 
 
                                                            
73 Smith, D. (2010). Sources of innovation. In Exploring Innovation (pp. 85-99). Berkshire, UK: 
McGraw-Hill. 
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Human Capital: 
 Tertiary enrolment - fig 13 below indicates the enrolment level of tertiary 
students in China from 1984 to 2013. From 2% in 1984, the figure increased 
to 8% in 2000, 24% in 2010 and 30% in 2013. Its increasing tertiary 
enrolment puts China on par with advanced countries now. 
  
Fig 13. China’s gross enrolment ratio, tertiary (%)74 
 Number of scientific researchers and budget - fig 14 indicates that the 
number of researchers and research budget show a consisting pattern of 
increase. Together with fig 11’s data from OECD based on 2013 data, this 
shows that China is rapidly increasing its commitment to R&D. The 
government is committed to a R&D budget of 2.5% GDP in 2020 with basic 
science going from 5% to 10% in R&D spending. 
                                                            
74 The World Bank. (2016).  Gross enrolment ratio, tertiary, both sexes (%). Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD/countries/CN?page=6&display=default 
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Fig 14. China’s Research and Development75 
 Research talent augmented by returning overseas talents76 - the table below 
indicates international net flows of scientific authors of selected economies 
between 1999-2013, as compiled by OECD, and based on Scopus Custom 
Data. The estimates are based on the difference between implied inflows 
and outflows of scientific authors for the reference economy, as indicated 
by a change in the main affiliation of a Scopus ID over the author’s indexed 
publication span. The table below reflects the flow of scientific authors from 
the five largest net gaining countries and five largest net losing countries out 
of 25 countries in the database. 
 
                                                            
75 The World Bank. (2016).  R&D expenditure (% of GDP). Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS?page=3 
The World Bank. (2016). Researchers in R&D (per million people). Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6?page=3 
76 China had one of the most active program attracting returning scientist. For more details, look at 
Yu, W. (2002). China's Drive to Attract the Return of its Expatriate Talent. In J. Wong 
(Ed.), China's Economy into the New Century (pp. 387-404). Singapore: National University of 
Singapore. 
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Period 1999-2003 2004-2008 2009-2013 Total 
US 11836 615 -2457 9994 
China -902 4052 6083 9233 
Switzerland 997 2051 4923 7971 
Australia 34 1446 4605 6085 
South Korea 814 1743 1209 3766 
India -2390 -3170 -1334 -6894 
Italy -889 -1739 -5449 -8077 
Japan -1782 -3398 -3594 -8774 
France -3046 -3214 -2505 -8765 
UK -2298 -2956 -6297 -11551 
 
Fig 15. International net flow of scientific authors77 
 China’s scientific and technical journal output has also shown a marked 
increase since 2013, and the trend continues today (figure 16). 
                                                            
77 OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015. International net flows of scientific 
authors, selected economies, 1999-2013. Retrieved from http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888933273360 
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Fig 16. Scientific Journal Articles Output78 
 The quality of Chinese scientific journal articles is improving - China is now 
one of the top 4 publishers in 11 out of the 25 disciplines monitored by the 
OECD. The fields where China is not included in the top 4 are: social 
sciences - psychology, economics, business, arts and humanities; biological 
sciences and health care - neuroscience, biochemistry, medicine, immuno- 
and microbiology, dentistry, veterinary, agri- and bio-sciences; health care 
- nursing, health professions; earth sciences. The US is the leader in all 25 
disciplines. Fig 17 shows the breakdown of countries in which China is the 
top 4 for the largest number of 10% top-cited publications. 
                                                            
78 The World Bank. (2016). Scientific and technical journal articles. Retrieved from 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SC/countries/CN?page=6&display=default 
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Fig 17. Top 4 countries with the largest number of 10% top-cited 
publications, by field, 2003-201279 
 
 The trend for China’s output of scientific and technical publications also 
compares favourably with its international peers. Output increased by 400% 
between 2003 and 2012 and China is the second biggest source of scientific 
papers after the US. The quality of its publications has improved marginally 
by less than 2% in terms of percentage of most cited output published during 
the period; the quality of Chinese scientific paper is comparable to that of 
Japan (fig 18).  
                                                            
79 OECD. (2015). Highlights of the OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2015. 
Compedium of Bibliometric Science Indicators 2014. Retrieved from 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/Science-brief-scoreboard.pdf. 
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Fig 18. Number of science articles published and more often cited80 
 
Entrepreneurial spirit: 
 A common measure of entrepreneurial spirit is the formation of new 
businesses. China has compared favourably with other countries in this 
respect.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
80 OECD and SCImago Research Group. (2015). Trends in scientific publication output and 
excellence, selected countries, 2003-2012: number of documents and share among 10% most cited, 
by author affiliation, whole counts. Compedium of Bibliometric Science Indicators 2014. 
Retrieved from http://oe.cd/scientometrics.  
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# Country Number of New 
Businesses 2010 
Number of New 
Businesses 2014 
% Change 
1 China 811,100 1,609,700 98 
2 United Kingdom 385,741 581,173 51 
3 India 67,509 98,437 46 
4 Italy 57,253 83,000 45 
- BRIC average - - 42 
5 Australia 157,667 223,013 41 
6 Germany 417,644 585,700 40 
7 France 119,319 165,725 39 
- G7 average   31 
8 United States 505,473 561,488 11 
9 Japan 99,616 106,644 7 
 
  Fig 19. Number of start-ups from 2010 to 2014 for selected countries81 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship: 
 China started its annual announcement of the top 500 corporations in China 
in 2004. Comparing the sales figure of its top 500 manufacturers in 2014 to 
that of 2004, the smallest top 500 manufacturers’ sales went from RMB 2.02 
billion (USD 240 million) to RMB 6.82 billion (USD 1060 million). Among 
the more dynamic top 500 private corporations, more than 70% of them 
engage in manufacturing and the smallest top 500 private corporations had 
2014 sales of RMB 9.5 billion (USD 1450 million)82,. 
Innovation and execution capacity: 
 We use several parameters to analyse a country’s innovation and execution 
capacities at the micro-level using patent data. One of them is that the 
                                                            
81 UHY. Chinese lead global growth in new start-ups but economic slowdown threatens business 
creation. Retrieved from http://www.uhy.com/chinese-lead-global-growth-in-new-start-ups-but-
economic-slowdown-threatens-business-creation/ 
82 China Federation of Business全国工商联. (2016). 500 Top Private Business in 2015中国民营
企业 500强. Retrieved from http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnxz/201508/22/t20150822_6292464.shtml   
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business holds more patents than an individual as it has more execution 
capacity to commercialize the patent. Another is that domestic entities hold 
more patents than foreign entities. Also the number of patents issued or 
applied must show an increasing trend.  
 Fig 20 below shows the percentage distribution of outstanding invention 
patents based on State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) data. The 
increasing dominance of domestic institutions is clear.  
 
  Fig 20. Percentage distribution of outstanding invention patent83 
 Businesses hold more than 60% of outstanding domestic patents. They are 
in good position to monetize their inventions as compared to others. China’s 
universities hold a very high percentage of patents that are unique84. 
                                                            
83 State Intellectual Property Office 国家知识产权局规划发展司. (2015). China effective patent 
report 2014 中国有效专利年度报告 2014. 
84 Nelson, R. R. (2008). Why Do Firms Differ & How Does It Matter? A Revisitation. Seoul 
Journal of Economics, 21(4), 607-619. 
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  Fig 21. Domestic invention patent holders in China85 
 We observe the same trend in patent filing as we do for the outstanding 
patent holding. Locals now file much more patents than foreigners, as 
shown in fig 22 below. 
 
  Fig 22. SIPO patent filing based on nationalities86 
                                                            
85 WIPO. Number of outstanding domestic invention patent holders in China, 2000-2015. 
Retrieved from http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
86 State Intellectual Property Office国家知识产权局规划发展司. (2015). China effective patent 
report 2014中国有效专利年度报告 2014. 
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 Business is also the most active in patent filing. 
 
  
Fig 23. SIPO patent filling based on domestic classification87 
At the  micro-level,  instead of relying on home data to prove technological 
competence, we also used data provided by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). WIPO provides data for 5 sectors and 35 technical fields.  
There is home bias in patent activities for all countries. One way to look at 
technological leadership is by examining patent filing and publications under 
WIPO’s Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT). PCT  is an international treaty with 148 
members that accord first to file status in all member countries to patent filers once 
they file under PCT in their home country. It is agreed that patent files under the 
PCT are more innovative, creative and have higher commercial value than home-
based filings. 
                                                            
87 State Intellectual Property Office国家知识产权局规划发展司. (2015). China effective patent 
report 2014中国有效专利年度报告 2014. 
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There are arguments over how representative a patent can be in assessing a firm 
or country’s leadership in certain areas of technologies. Trade secrets or knowhow 
can usually also accord protection to intelletual property and are not subjected to 
publication of said technology. However, the proliferation of reverse and forward 
engineering has made patent filing an increasing attractive option to protect 
intellectual property rights (IPR). Here, we use PCT data to establish a country’s 
relative technological capacity among nations88. 
 Chinese patent application has dramatically increased since the early 2000s. 
From 781 patent filings under the PCT in 2000, the country filed 29817 
cases in 2015, a growth by 38 times in 16 years. It is now the third largest 
filer of patents under the PCT. Base on filing data, it filed 13.7% of all patent 
application in 2015 compared to the traditional leaders, the US’s 26.3% and 
Japan’s 20.3%89. 
 
 
                                                            
88 Odagari, H., Akira, G., Atsushi, S., & Nelson, R. (2010). Intellectual Property Rights, 
Development, and Catch Up: An International Comparative Study. Oxford University Press. 
 
89 WIPO. Who filed the Most PCT patents applications in 2015? (2016, March). Retrieved from 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographics_systems_2015.pdf 
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Fig 24. Patent application by China under PCT90 
 The trend based on the number of PCT publications also confirms the 
growing influence of China on international patents. In 2011, China 
published 7.25% of all PCT patents and in 2015, this figure grew to 11.5%. 
The closer the ratio between filing and publication is, the more confident 
the applicant is in its technology. 
                                                            
90 WIPO. Number of PCT applications by filling date in China, 2000-2015. Retrieved from 
http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
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Fig 25. Number of PCT publication by China91 
 PCT patent filing falls under 5 technological sectors and 35 technical fields. 
They are as follows: 
 Electrical Engineering (8 technical fields) – Electrical machinery, 
apparatus and energy, audio visual technology, telecommunications, digital 
communications, basic communication processes, computer technology, IT 
methods for management, and semiconductors. 
 Instruments (5 technical fields) – Optics, measurement, analysis of 
biological materials, control, and medical technology. 
 Chemistry (11 technical fields) – Organic fine chemistry, 
biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, macromolecular chemistry (polymers),  
food chemistry, basic materials chemistry, materials (metallurgy), surface 
                                                            
91 Who filed the Most PCT patents applications in 2015 (2016). Retrieved from 
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/docs/infographics_systems_2015.pdf 
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technology (coating); micro-structural and nanotechnology, chemical 
engineering, and environmental technology. 
 Mechanical Engineering (8 technical fields) – Handling, machine 
tools; engines (pumps, turbine); textile and paper machines, other special 
machines, thermal processes and apparatus, mechanical elements, and 
transport. 
 Other Fields (3 technical fields) – Furniture, other consumer goods, 
and civil engineering. 
   Looking at the percentage of total filing for China in a technical field under 
the PCT can indicate the level of Chinese technology in that particular field. 
Fig 26 below shows that China is among the strongest players in digital 
communication and telecommunication. China accounted for more than 20% 
in each category in 2015. It is a strong player in audio-visual technology and 
computer technology, with a 15-20% filing share. The only field in which 
in lags behind under the electrical engineering sector is IT methods for 
management, where it is below 10%. 
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Fig 26. Percentage of total publication in the electrical engineering sector92 
 As shown in fig 27 below, China is a strong player in optics and still 
improving. However, it is behind in other technological fields under the 
instruments sector. Control and mesurement are two fields showing good 
improvement in the last 4 years. 
 
Fig 27. Percentage of total publication in the instruments sector93 
                                                            
92 WIPO. Percentage of total publication in China’s electrical engineering sector, 2011-2015. 
Retrieved from http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
93 WIPO. Percentage of total publication in China’s instruments sector, 2011-2015. Retrieved from 
http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
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 China has shown consistent improvement since 2011 in the number of PCT 
publications in the first five fields of Chemistry. However, it started from a 
low base and remains behind in the 5 technological fields (fig 28). 
 
Fig 28. Percentage of total publication in the chemistry sector (part I)94 
 
 With reference to fig 29, China has shown consistent improvement since 
2011 in the number of PCT publications in the remaining six fields under 
Chemistry. However, it started from a low base and remains behind in the 6 
technological fields. 
 
                                                            
94 WIPO. Percentage of total publication in China’s chemistry sector, 2011-2015. Retrieved from 
http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
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Fig 29. Percentage of total publications in the chemistry sector (part II)95 
 In the mechanical engineering sector, China has shown consistent 
improvement, particularly in thermal process and apparatus, which crossed 
the 10% mark.Its momentum looks good. However, in other areas, it lags 
behind (fig 30). 
 
Fig 30. Percentage of total publications in the mechanical enginnering industry96 
                                                            
95 WIPO. Percentage of total publication in China’s chemistry sector, 2011-2015. Retrieved from 
http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
96 WIPO. Percentage of total publication in China’s mechanical engineering sector, 2011-2015. 
Retrieved from http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
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 China is apparently strong in furnitures, games and other consumer goods. 
However, they are not related to the industries under Made in China 2025 
(fig 31).  
 
Fig 31. Percentage of total publications in other fields97 
 If we remove the 3 technological fields that are not related to Made in China 
2025, China should not encounter technological problems in achieving its 
goal in industries related to digital communication and telecommunication. 
They should also have a good chance in computer technology, audio-visual 
technology and optics.  
 China’s catch-up dilemma is concentrated in chemistry, mechanical 
engineering and other areas of instruments. They generally score in the 4-
10% area and obviously more effort is needed if China wants to catch up. 
However, looking at the technologicals target set in Made in China 2025, 
China had set low targets and it stands a good chance of achieving them. 
                                                            
97 WIPO. Percentage of total publication in other fields, 2011-2015. Retrieved from 
http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
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 Even in the 4%-5% vicinity for basic materials chemistry (4.75%), 
macromolecular chemistry - polymer (4.49%), and analysis of biological 
materials (4.58%), China should possess enough absorptive capacity to 
learn and advance in the 10 industries targeted under Made in China 2025 
if they are given the technological (learning) opportunities.  
Comparison with global peers on patent activities: 
We review the global technological distance between China and the other 
countries by looking at the three top PCT patent publishing countries in each of the 
35 categories under PCT.  Three countries – US, Japan and China accounted for 60% 
of PCT filing and they are also the top three in almost all of the categories. We 
classified the findings as follows: 
 China is the leading country in one category- Electrical Engineering-Digital 
Communication. 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data98 
Fig 32. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries – Electrical 
Engineering -Digital communications 
                                                            
98 WIPO. Percentage of total publication in other fields, 2011-2015. Retrieved from 
http://ipstats.wipo.int/ipstatv2/searchForm. 
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 China ranks second in PCT publications in two categories and it is close to 
global frontier in these two categories: Electrical Engineering-
Telecommunication; Other Fields - Other Consumer Goods.  
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data 99 
Fig 33. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries-
Electrical Engineering -Telecommunciations 
 
 
Source: Author compilation bsed on WIPO data100 
Fig 34. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries-Other 
Fields - Other consumer goods 
                                                            
99 Ibid. 
100 Ibid. 
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 China ranks second in another two PCT publication categories: Instruments 
-Optics; Electrical Engineering - Computer Technology. However, if we 
base the technological distance between two countries by the number of 
patent publications. The technological distance between number one 
publishing country, US and China is relatively large. 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data101 
Fig 35. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries-Instruments – 
Optics 
                                                            
101 Ibid. 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data102 
Fig 36. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries-Electrical 
Engineering- Computer technology 
 
 There are 30 PCT publication categories that China is not in the first two 
position. Out of the 30 categories, China is catching up to the global leader  
in the following areas: Electrical Engineering- Audio-Visual Technology; 
Electrical Engineering- Electrical Machinery, Apparatus and Energy; 
Electrical Engineering – Basic Communication Process; Instrument- 
Control; Other Fields- Furniture, Games. 
                                                            
102 Ibid. 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data103 
Fig 37. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries-Electrical 
Engineering-Audio-visual technology 
 
Source: Author compilation 
Fig 38. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries-Electrical 
Engineering-Electrical machinery, apparatus and energy 
 
                                                            
103 Ibid. 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO104 
Fig 39. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries-Electrical 
Engineering-Basic communication processes 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO105 
Fig 40. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries – 
Instruments - Control 
                                                            
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO106 
Fig 41. PCT registration cases and percentage of top three countries-Other 
Fields-Furniture, games 
 China is behind in 25 categories based on PCT publications and the 
technological distance in these areas with the two global leaders are 
significant:  
                                                            
106 Ibid. 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data 107 
Fig 42. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China 
– Electrical Engineering - IT methods for management 
 
Source: Author compilation 
Fig 43. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China 
-Electrical Engineering-Semiconductors 
 
                                                            
107 Ibid. 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data108 
Fig 44. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China-
Instrument- Measurement 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data109 
Fig 45. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China-
Instrument-               Analysis of biological materials 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data110 
Fig 46. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China 
– Instrument -          Medical technology 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data111 
Fig 47. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China – Chemistry - Organic fine chemistry 
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111 Ibid. 
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
40.00
45.00
50.00
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Instruments ‐ Medical technology
China USA Japan % of China % of US % of Japan
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
35.00
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Chemistry ‐ Organic fine chemistry
China USA Japan % of China % of US % of Japan
 ‐ 99 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data112 
 Fig 48. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China – Chemistry - Biotechnology 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data113 
Fig 49. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China – Chemistry - Pharmaceuticals 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data114 
Fig 50. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China – Chemistry - Macromolecular chemistry, polymers 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data115 
Fig 51. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China 
– Chemistry -            Food chemistry 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data116 
Fig 52. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China – Chemistry - Basic materials chemistry 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data117 
Fig 53. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China – Chemistry - Organic fine chemistry 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data118 
Fig 54. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries 
and China – Chemistry - Surface technology, coating 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data119 
Fig 55. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China – Chemistry - Micro-structural and nanotechnology 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data120 
Fig 56. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China – Chemistry - Organic fine chemistry 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data121 
Fig 57. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China 
– Chemistry  - Environmental technology 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data122 
Fig 58. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China 
-         Mechanical Engineering - Handling 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data123 
Fig 59. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China -         Mechanical Engineering - Machine tools 
 
                                                            
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid. 
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Mechanical Engineering ‐ Handling
China USA Japan % of China % of US % of Japan
0.00
5.00
10.00
15.00
20.00
25.00
30.00
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Mechanical Engineering ‐ Machine Tools
China USA Japan % of China % of US % of Japan
 ‐ 105 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data124 
Fig 60. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China -         Mechanical Engineering - Engines, pumps, turbines 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data125 
Fig 61. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China -         Mechanical Engineering - Textile and paper machines 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data126 
Fig 62. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China -         Mechanical Engineering - Other special machines 
 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data127 
Fig 63. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China 
-         Mechanical Engineering – Thermal processes and apparatus 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO128 
Fig 64. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China -         Mechanical Engineering - Mechanical elements 
 
Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data129 
Fig 65. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and China 
-         Mechanical Engineering - Transport 
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Source: Author compilation based on WIPO data130 
Fig 66. PCT registration cases and percentage of top two countries and 
China - Other Fields – Civil engineering 
 
Chinese PCT publication data revealed two interesting information: Firstly, 
China in many categories of technologies is still playing a catch-up role. It is the 
leader in the category of digital comunication,  closing in the world leader in four 
categories and rising fast in five categories to the first two global leaders. However, 
in the great majority of the remaining 25 categories, Chinese technology distance 
from the two world leaders are substantial. It is easier for a country to play 
technology catch-up because the roadmap is already defined by the trailblazer. 
Secondly, Chinese experience in technolgy catch-up is different from South Korea 
and Taiwan. The country had developed meaningful patent publications in all 35 
categories of technology. Two of the usual constraints in the development of new 
industries: cumulative technology and general knowledge base are not important in 
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the case of China. Their scales and breaths in technological foundation provide a 
good starting point for both technology catch-up and indigenous innovation to build 
new industries.    
Summary of Findings at micro-level: 
 Our findings indicated that China developed the four elements at the micro-
level under neo-Schumpeterian analysis that are necessary pre-conditions for their 
success in the Made in China 2025. The country has built up a growing and 
increasingly sophisticated human capital base for innovation.  The human capital 
base is turning out to be increasingly high in quality scientific research outputs to 
serve as theoretical base of innovations. Moreover,   more start-up and larger 
corporations are acting as innovation enabling entrepreneurs by converting these 
innovations into patents to enhance the innovations’ monetization propects. The 
country is closing the technology gap with the global leader in many areas of 
technologies as shown by its fast growing international patent publications in all 
areas of technologies . The country had developed meaningful technology presence 
in all 35 areas of patent under the international PCT categories of technology. The 
Chinese technological  foundation have therefore both depth and breadth. It has 
therefore reached a stage where the country can not only embark on meaningful 
indigenous technological innovations and breakthroughs, but also easily absorb 
imported technology with the presence of strong foundation .   
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Chapter 5 - Research Findings at the meso-level of neo-Schumpeterian 
Analysis 
 This chapter reports the findings on the approach taken by the Chinese 
government in developing the high-speed rail industry at the meso-level.  
 The meso-level or industrial level is the monetization area of innovations. 
It provides the ecosystem to monetize innovations and drive economic growth. 
While micro-level successful entrepreneurs or corporations come and go, a 
successful meso-level industry maintains its innovative power and global leadership 
for a long period of time. Empirical evidences show that all developed countries 
sustain their economic dynamism on a few anchor industries. Nurturing high value-
added innovative industries is an unwritten economic policy of all developed and 
aspiring countries.  
Introduction to Findings at meso-level: 
 We use the neo-Schumpeterian framework of technological regime to 
analyse the challenges a country face in developing a new, higher value-added 
innovative industry.  
In particular, we will be using this framework to analyse China’s High 
Speed Rail (HSR) industry – one of the ten industries under Made in China 2025 – 
and find out how China succeeded in developing this industry. A historical 
evolutionary narrative provides the best perspective to understand the challenges 
the industry met along its evolution from scratch to the present state, the timeline 
approach highlights the critical decisions that the authority make to overcome 
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problems along the way. We use three historical time periods to facilitate the 
investigation:  
1. The Chinese HSR industry (before 2004);  
2. The acquisition and assimilation of foreign rolling stock technology 
(2004-2007) 
3. The indigenous technological breakthrough and building of the local 
HSR industry (2008 – present)  
 The four parameters of technological regime, in the context of the Chinese 
HSR industry, are as follow:  
1. Opportunities (OPP). This refers to how likely it is for China to 
acquire the necessary technology in the HSR industry, either through 
indigenous technological breakthrough, or from foreign sources; 
2. Appropriability (APP). This refers to the different kinds of reward 
opportunity the HSR industry has for its participants; 
3. Cumulativeness (CUM). This refers to how important earlier 
accumulated knowledge on rail technology is to current innovation 
efforts;   
4. Knowledge Base (BAS). This refers to the kind of knowledge base 
needed in current innovations in the HSR industry. Does it require 
very broad general knowledge that requires a lot of complementary 
technologies to fully make use of the innovation, or does it require a 
niche and specified field of study where once a particular 
breakthrough is achieved, the industry innovation is done?  
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The four parameters of the technological regime highlight the pre-
conditions that a country must work out in the development of a new, innovative 
industry. They represent issues that face the setting up of a new industry. Remiss to 
address any concerns in the four parameters will set back the innovation process at 
the meso-level.  
Neo-Schumpeterian analysis focuses in technological foundation in the 
setting up of new industry. It puts the opportunity to acquire the necessary 
technology for that industry as the number one challenge. This is particularly 
relevant for fast changing industries that are capital and technology intensive. Any 
missteps in keeping up with evolving technologies easily eliminate the lagging 
player from the market. The appropriability parameter relates to the economic 
incentives to attract aspiring players to the industry and keep the existing players to 
continue their innovation and reinvestment endeavours. The cumulativeness 
parameter represents the extent of implicit knowledges that is required to succeed 
in the industry. The knowledge base is a measure of the complexity of the products 
and its linkage with other industries. Three of the four parameters relate to the 
nature of the industry and they are more technical in nature rather than economic in 
nature131.   
Findings: China’s HSR industry and its market success 
                                                            
131 Breschi, S., Malerba, F., & Orsenigo, L. (2000). Technological Regimes & Schumpeterian 
Patterns of Innovation. The Economic Journal, 110, 388-410. 
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The first modern Chinese HSR line (117 km connecting Beijing and Tianjin) 
commenced operation on August 1, 2008132. By the end of 2015, the total length of 
the HSR system is more than 19,000 km, providing 4,200 trips daily with a 
passenger capacity of 4 million per day. During that year, the HSR system carried 
1.161 million passengers, accounted for 45.8% of all rail passengers. The on-time 
departure rate was 98.8%, and the on-time arrival rate, 95.4%. 
During 2016’s peak Spring festival travel season, the HSR hit a daily record 
of 6.28 passengers. Up to mid-2016, it has carried more than 5 billion passengers. 
This is 3.74 billion more passengers since the July 23, 2011 Wenzhou train 
accident133. The European Rail Authority (ERA) and International Train Union 
(UIC) classify the Chinese HSR system as one of the most reliable and safe railway 
system in the world134,135.  
In November 2015, China agreed to build the 150 km Jakarta-Bandung HSR 
system over 3 years using the Chinese standard, covering line design, line 
construction and rolling stock acquisition to daily operation. It was only in 2015 
                                                            
132 The 405 km standard-gauge, dual track, electrified Qinhuangdao-Shenyang passenger rail was 
built between 1999 and 2003, it supports commercial train service at 200-250 km/h and it is the 
first truly high speed railway line in China. However, the train used then was the experimental 
Chinese designed model and different from the foreign train technology brought in under 
technological transfer agreement in 2004. Today’s Chinese HSR industry was built under the 
technological foundation of the 2004 transfer. Hence most experts consider the August 1 2008 
Beijing-Tianjin HSR operation should be considered the inaugural run. 
133 A train hit by power outage in the thunder storm and stationary on the track was hit by a 
running train on its rear near Wenzhou on July 23, 2016. One car fell from the viaduct and cause 
40 dead and 192 injuries.   
134Chinese high speed network to double in latest master plan. (2016, July 21). Retrieved July 22, 
2016, from http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/infrastructure/single-view/view/chinese-high-
speed-network-to-double-in-latest-master-plan.html 
135 Chinese High Speed Rail carry more than five billion passengers since inception 中国动车组累
计发送旅客破 50亿人次. (2016, July 21). Retrieved July 22, 2016, from 
http://companies.caixin.com/2016-07-21/100968820.html?cxw=Android&Sfrom=Email 
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that the full set of indigenously-developed HSR system (380km/h top speed CRH 
380) was successfully modified. The move to Chinese standard on all phases of the 
HSR means that China had almost completely localized the HSR industry. From 
2004 to 2015, the country managed to progress from a technology importer to an 
exporter. This is a rare industrial development in this technologically intensive field. 
Currently, the local content of Chinese HSR rolling stock ratio is reportedly 90% 
upward, with all design and part parameters being Chinese in origin136.   
The HSR industrial development also carries significant social and 
economic implications for China. The HSR carried 1,161 million passengers in 
2015, almost three times the volume of airline passenger throughput of 430 million. 
The significant passenger transportation capacity increase from the HSR facilitated 
the development of a single national market in labour and goods. The rail cargo 
capacity boost from the diversion of the rail passengers in conventional track to the 
dedicated passenger line also facilitated the lowering of national logistic cost. It was 
estimated that in 2015, the relatively energy-efficient rail system carried a 
combined 25% of national passenger and cargos, while its share of energy 
consumption in the transportation sector was only 6%137. Financially, in 2015, it 
was reported that at least 6 of the HSR lines generated net profit, and that the 1,318 
km Beijing-Shanghai HSR was the most profitable HSR line in the world, carrying 
130 million passengers and generating more than USD 1 billion in net profit. The 
exclusive HSR operator, China Railway Corporation (CRC), is meeting its financial 
                                                            
136Shen, J. (n.d.). Local content of Chinese High Speed Rail Rolling Stock. Retrieved July 16, 
2016, from http://www.zhihu.com/question/28006897  
137 Chinese High Speed Rail carry more than five billion passengers since inception 中国动车组累
计发送旅客破 50亿人次. (2016, July 21). Retrieved July 22, 2016, from 
http://companies.caixin.com/2016-07-21/100968820.html?cxw=Android&Sfrom=Email 
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target even it is running a HSR building blitz138.China’s HSR has been successful 
in both domestic and international markets. More importantly, it apparently meets 
both the government’s social and transportation objectives of the HSR industry. 
The Chinese economy is facing a structural headwind with growth slowing 
down to 6.7% in the first half of 2016. The government is using the HSR industry 
and its related urban railway transport industry to anchor the infrastructure spending 
to support economic growth. The Chinese government published a “Three-year 
(2016-2018) action plan for the construction of major transportation infrastructure 
facilities” in July 2016. This action plan provides a comprehensive list of 303 major 
projects with total investment of RMB 4.7 trillion, and involves railways, 
waterways, airports and urban railway transits. Over three quarter of the 
transportation plan is earmarked for rail related infrastructure. The plan includes 86 
railway projects with total length of 20,000km, and 103 urban transit projects with 
total length of 2,000 km. The estimated costs are RMB 2 trillion and RMB 1.6 
trillion respectively.  
As shown in the table below, during the past 5-year plans, actual fixed asset 
investment on rail industry always exceeded the initial and the revised plan. This 
shows that the government has confidence on the development of the HSR industry. 
                                                            
138 At least six High Speed Rail line makes money now. (2016, July 22). Retrieved July 22, 2016, 
from https://view.inews.qq.com/a/FIN2016072200580208 
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Source: UBS139 
Fig 67. Actual versus planned Railway Fixed Asset Investment in Five-Year 
Plan 
 
Chinese HSR before 2004 
 In the early 1990s, Chinese commercial train service ran at an average speed 
of only 48 km/h under a congested railway network, steadily losing its market share 
to air transportation and the expanding highway network. In 1992, the central 
                                                            
139 Xu, R. (2015). China Railway Sector-Positive on rail FAI in 13th FYP (pp. 1-60, Working 
paper). Hong Kong: UBS. 
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government adopted the Ministry of Railway (MOR)’s proposal to develop a high-
speed railway system as the next backbone of rail system in China. the Railway 
Development Plan in the next 10 years and under Eighth Five-Year Science 
Development Plan marked the start of China’s high speed rail development. 
However, raging debates ensued inside China on whether the country should adopt 
conventional high speed wheel technology or maglev technology, and whether it 
should develop the technology indigenously or adopt the then- overseas operating 
Shinkansen, TGV or ICE technologies. The arguments caused significant delay in 
the HSR project implementation and the inaugural 117 km Beijing -Tianjin HSR 
line’s construction started only in 2005.  
In 2004’s Mid-to-Long Term Railway Development Plan, the State Council 
adopted conventional track technology as the backbone of China’s HSR system. 
The plan decided to stop indigenous HSR train development program and bring in 
foreign technology, clearing the way for rapid construction of standard gauge 
(1,435mm) and passenger-dedicated HSR lines in China. It envisioned the total 
HSR network to be 12,000 long by 2020 with 4 major East-West Horizontal trunk 
line and 4 North-South Vertical trunk line, and the total national railway to be 
100,000km140. 
                                                            
140The four vertical dedicated passenger HSR lines include the following: 1. Beijing-Shanghai 
Passenger Line-1318 km. 2. Beijing-Wuhan- Guangzhou-Shenzhen Passenger Line-2229km. 3. 
Beijing-Shenyang-Harbin (Dalian) Passenger Line- 1700km. 4. Hangzhou-Ningbo-Fuzhou-
Shenzhen Passenger Line-1495 km.  
The four horizontal dedicated HSR lines include the following: 1. Xuzhou-Zhengzhou-Lanzhou 
Passenger Line-1363 km. 2. Shanghai-Kunming Passenger Line- 2066 km. 3. Qingdao-
Shijiazhuang-Taiyuan Passenger Line-873 km.  4. Shanghai-Wuhan-Chongqing-Chengdu 
Passenger Line-2078km. 
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On hindsight, MOR’s decision to stop the development of indigenous HSR 
train is a good decision. China avoided further delay on HSR development and the 
failure taught its technical staff valuable lessons. MOR was able to make correct 
technological choice when it set up the HSR standard in 2004, particularly in the 
case of selecting distributed traction over the popular concentrated traction141. The 
R&D personnel involved in the failed domestic high speed train project were re-
assigned to the various units working on the imported technologies and they 
absorbed the imported technology quickly142.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
141 China bought foreign technology for 200 km/h train in 2004 and the decision to use distributed 
traction system facilitates the transition to subsequent higher speed train to 350 km/h. Experts 
suspect that the decision is based on the result of the Japanese HSR system as well as their own 
experience of difficulties in the R&D of China Star with concentrated traction, as against 
Changbaishan with distributed traction.    
142 In the case of the failed China Star, the team leader became the team leader of CRH2A, and 90% 
of the core development team of CRH2A came from the former China Star R&D team as well.  
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(persons) 
No. of 
productio
n units 
KDZ1 1988 Changchun    
   Zhuzhou 
RI 
2M2T 140/141 191 1 
X2000 (new 
speed per 
hour)  
1998 ADTranz M + 6T 210/200 415 1 
DDJ1(Shark) 1999 Zhuzhou E, 
   
Changchun 
   Sifang, 
   Tangshan, 
   Nanjing 
1M6T 220/200 438 1 
KDZIA 
(Spring City) 
1999 Changchun, 
   Zhuzhou 
RI 
3M3T 140/132 180 1 
DJJ1 (Blue 
Arrow) 
2000 Zhuzhou E, 
   
Changchun 
1M6T,2M10
T 
235/200 423/752 8 
DJFI1(Star of 
Central 
China) 
2001 Zhuzhou M, 
   Sifang, 
   Zhuzhou 
RI, 
   
Zhengzhou 
8M6T,4M2T 178/160 548/139
8 
1 
DJF2(Pioneer) 2001 Nanjing 4M2T 200/160 424 1 
DJF3(Changb
ei Shan) 
2003 Changchun 6M3T 210/160 650 2 
DJJ2 (Star of 
China 
2002 Zhuzhou, 
Datong, 
   
Changchun, 
   Sifang 
2M9T 270/160 673 1 
Fig 68. Chinese indigenous high speed train model developed before 2004. 
Source: Author’s collection 
While the HSR discussion was ongoing, MOR embarked on a series of 
nationwide "Speed Up" campaigns to increase the service speed and capacity on 
existing lines between April 1994 and April 2007. The focus of the “Speed Up” 
exercise was to gradually increase train speeds on existing routes while also 
developing Chinese know-how in all aspects of rail infrastructure and train 
operation. Between 1997 and 2001, the maximum speed of conventional trains 
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operated with locomotives increased from 100 km/h to 160km/h on around 13,000 
km of passenger routes. 
Measures employed in the “Speed Up” campaign included double-tracking, 
electrification, improvements in grade (through tunnels and bridges), improvements 
in turn curvature, installation of continuous welded rail, development of new 
locomotives and modernizing of signaling systems. The new technologies 
employed in these projects were almost all developed indigenously. This experience 
not only helped China to become the world technology leader in the upgrading of 
conventional track to either sub-high speed passenger lines (top speed below 200 
km/h in the route) or combo cargo-passenger line. It also laid the foundation for the 
subsequent setting up of unique Chinese specifications in track construction and 
speedy absorption of HSR technologies from foreign joint venture partners143. 
Upgrading existing tracks to run sub-high speed train is a technological area often 
neglected by major developed countries’ rolling stock companies, but this know-
how offers significant economic benefits to developing countries where old rail 
network can be rehabilitated to provide cheaper alternatives. The Chinese HSR 
track specification is the most significant differentiation factor between Chinese 
HSR and that of Shinkansen, TGV and ICE. 
 The failed attempt to build an indigenous HSR train before 2004 still helped 
China to build up a local technology base on HSR rolling stock development. In 
contrary to common perception that the success of the Chinese HSR industry relied 
on economics of scale, the successful localization of the industry also contributed 
                                                            
143 The Qinhuangdao-Shenyang line shown the greater compatibility of HSR on conventional track 
with the rest of China’s standard gauge rail network.     
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to the Chinese government’s subsequent decision to support the expansion of the 
HSR program.   
The acquisition and assimilation of foreign rolling stock technology (2004-2007) 
Compared to Japan’s Shinkansen, Frances’ TGV and Germany’s ICE which 
first ran in 1964, 1981 and 1991 respectively, China is a late comer to the HSR 
industry. The construction of the Beijing-Tianjin HSR only started in 2005. In 2004, 
China suspended its indigenous high speed train development and opted to import 
HSR rolling technology under technology transfer agreements with foreign train-
makers, including Bombadier, Kawasaki, Alstom and Siemens. Under the 
agreements, MOR also tasked its two rolling stock manufacturing arms, China 
South Rail (CSR) & China North Rail (CNR), to work with foreign technical 
partners to produce rolling stock for the HSR project144. The electric multiple unit 
(train sets) produced were given the titles CRH-1 to CRH-5 (CRH stand for China 
Rail High Speed): 
(1) The CRH-1 series is produced by Bombardier's joint venture CSR Sifang 
(Qingdao) Transportation (BST)145;  
 CRH-1A: an 8-car version train; maximum operating speed of 
250 km/h, derived from Bombadier Regina design. 
 CRH-1B: a modified 16-car version; maximum operating speed 
of 250 km/h, derived from Bombadier Regina design. 
                                                            
144 CSR & CNR were merged at mid-2015 to form China Railway Rolling Corporation (CRRC) 
145 Bombardier rail division is based in Germany and the technology is considered of German 
origin. 
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 CRH-1E: a 16-car high-speed sleeper version; maximum 
operating speed of 250 km/h, derived from design of Bombadier 
Zefiro 250. 
(2)  The CRH-2 series is produced by CSR Sifang under license from 
Kawasaki. The design is derived from the Shinkansen E2-1000 series.  
 CRH-2A: 8-car version; maximum operating speed 250 km/h.  
 CRH-2B: modified 16-car version of CRH-2; maximum 
operating speed of 250 km/h. 
 CRH-2C (Stage one): 8-car version; maximum operating speed 
of 300 km/h. 
 CRH-2C (Stage two): 8-car model; maximum operating speed 
of 350 km/h. 
 CRH-2E: 16-car version of CRH2 with sleeping cars, maximum 
speed of 250km/h. 
(3) The CRH-3 is produced by CNR, under license from Siemens ICE-3 
(class 403) 
 CRH-3:  8-car model, maximum operating speed of 350 km/h. 
(4) The CRH-5A is produced by CNR, under license from Alstom. It is 
derived from the Alstom Pendolino ETR 600. 
 CRH-5A: 8-car model, maximum operating speed of 250 km/h. 
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In the 2004 HSR development strategy, the Chinese government set several 
important rules which contributed a lot to the speedy absorption and progress of the 
technology over other global peers. The success of the technology would not be 
possible without these rules:  
First, HSR track construction was based on Chinese specifications. The new 
specifications allowed China to adopt both the best practices available as well as 
incorporate its local indigenous innovation. In other words, China exploited the late 
comer advantage and designed a HSR system better than existing networks146. The 
decision to set up an entirely new specification in track infrastructure was in sharp 
contrast with that of the three technology leaders of HSR at that time: Japan’s track 
infrastructure remained essentially the same since its inception in 1964, and the 
TGV and ICE ran on mixed HSR and conventional train track basis. China’s unique 
track feature accords optimum compatibility between the train and its dynamic 
environments147, allowing the HSR to operate at the highest average speed today 
with upmost comfort. 
Second, all the 4 builders of the HSR train must be domestic corporations, 
and they must commit to integrate all domestic innovations in the communication, 
                                                            
146 The country use ballastless slab rail bed design, long-span bridge, elevated viaduct and many 
latest construction methods in the HSR rail line construction. China innovated on the imported 
slab technology and the country is the only one in the world now that can build HSR under all soil 
condition, weather condition.    
147 China pioneer many important innovations in track construction: extensive use of no ballast 
slab track construction, high turning ratio of 7km at 350km/h, 5.5 km at 200 km/h, maximum 
tunnel diameter of 10 meter, maximum line spacing of 4.8 meter between two tracks, extensive use 
of bridge/viaduct in passenger dedicated lines. These innovations allow Chinese HSR to run at 
much higher average speed than Japanese and European HSR lines. The highest average speed of 
Chinese line runs at 299 km/h for the 1433 km Beijing -Shanghai line. The highest European line 
runs at 250 km/h for Paris-Lyon and Japanese Tokyo-Osaka average speed is 230 km/h.  
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scheduling, and operation of the passenger service and power traction systems. 
These ensure the continuing development of indigenous technology148. 
Third, China insisted most of the train sets ordered to be produced in China 
with technology transfer fee paid and made as part of the purchase149. This policy 
facilitated the development of the Chinese indigenous HSR rolling stock industry. 
Today, there are two HSR manufacturing clusters around the former CSR 
production base at Zhuzhou and Hunan, and another two clusters around former 
CNR production base at Changchun, Jilin150. 
Fourth, China chose distributed traction over conventional traction, a 
decision that was lauded as a smart technological choice. It excluded many popular 
choices such as the French TGV and German ICE-1, and all of the introduced CRH1, 
CRH2, CRH 3 and CRH5 used distributed traction151. 
The indigenous technological breakthrough and building of the local HSR 
industry (2009-present) 
                                                            
148 The HSR industry foreign technology importation is not a case of market for technology. The 
transaction is an outright technology purchase. China use its market size as a carrot in price 
negotiation but there is no assurance on subsequent purchase. Out of four foreign technology 
supplier, only Bombadier formed a joint venture to manufacture the trains. The trains were 
imported or built under technology transfer agreements with foreign technology provider. Chinese 
engineers then redesign and improve internal parts and come out a better product. 
149Alstom order of 60 units 200 km/h train set at euro 620m include transfer of 7 core 
technologies. 3 set were imported, 6 were CKD assembled in China, rest produced in China. 
Kawasaki order of 60 units 200km/h at RMB 9300m also include technology transfer, set number 
under importation, CKD and local produce the same as Alstom. Bombardier order of 40 units 200 
km/h and 40 units 300 km/h train sets from the only Sino-Canadian joint venture are locally 
source. Siemens order of 60 units 300 km/h train set at euro 669m also include technology transfer 
and 3 imported set, 57 locally produced set.   
150 CSR and CNR were merged in 2015 to form CRRC.  
151 Sone, S. (2015, October). Comparison of the technologies of the Japanese Shinkansen and 
Chinese High-speed Railways. Journal of Zhejiang University-SCIENCE A (Applied Physics & 
Engineering), 2015(10), 760-780. 
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 MOR had set assimilating imported HSR technology at the top of priority 
when they licensed the imported technology in the mid-2000s.152 Chinese train-
makers, after receiving transferred foreign technology, assimilated the imported 
technology and developed a considerable degree of self-sufficiency in making the 
next generation of high-speed trains by 2008.  
By 2008, China was confident on the progress of its HSR industry and 
revised the 2004 Mid-to-Long Term Railway Development Plan, raising the 
National HSR total length target from 12,000 km to 16,000 km in 2020. Likewise, 
the total railway length was revised from 100,000 km to 120,000 km. In 2008, the 
Chinese government issued Action Plan for the Independent Innovation of Chinese 
High-Speed Trains which aims at building an HSR technology innovation system 
based on technology import. MOR, together with the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MOST), took the lead in the implementation of the plan. 
From 2008 to 2010, the National Natural Science Foundation of China 
sponsored 55 HSR-related R&D projects. Out of this 55 projects, 33 were dedicated 
to localize and improve the imported technologies and the rest were dedicated to 
develop local indigenous technologies. MOR and MOST consolidated 11 research 
institutes, 25 universities, 51 national laboratories, 2 manufacturing State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE), CSR and SNR to participate in the R&D projects. 63 fellows 
from the Chinese Academy of Science and Chinese Academy of Engineering, over 
                                                            
152 China had identified nine key subsystems in HSR rolling stock – aerodynamics of the Electric 
Multiple Unit(EMU) train body, bogies, traction control systems, traction transformers, converters, 
traction motors, braking systems, network control systems, EMU system integration technology.  
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500 university professors, 200 research fellows and 10,000 technical staff 
participated in the R&D projects.    
 From basic research, applied research and laboratory prototype testing all 
the way to manufacturing, China developed a complete HSR technology industry 
ecosystem by the turn of the first decade of 21st century. From 2008 to 2010, 
Chinese companies applied for 1,284 patents and accounted for 72% of total HSR-
related patent applications from 1985 to 2011. China holds many new patents 
related to the internal components of the new train sets indigenously developed. 
These indigenously design new train set were based on original foreign design with 
re-designed major components to allow the trains to run at a much higher speed 
than the original foreign train design. China has developed indigenous technology 
in the 380 km/h category and the models CRH 380-A, CRH 380-AL, CRH 380-B, 
CRH 380-BL, CRH 380-CL were all locally designed and built153. The only foreign 
participation in China’s rolling stock industry is the Bombadier Sifang 
Transportation (BST)’s production of CRH 380-D (known as Zefiro 380 
internationally) and CRH 380-DL. The most popular model today in the Chinese 
380 km/h market is CRH 380-A. Unveiled in 2010, the CRH380A possessed world 
class technologies in traction converter, network control, aerodynamic body design 
and high speed bogie.  
China also used foreign merger & acquisition (M&A) to access critical 
missing technology.  Notable cases are the 2008 acquisition of UK’s Dynex Power 
by CSR for RMB 93 million (75%), as well as the 2015 acquisition of BOGE by 
                                                            
153 The first CRH 380A indigenously designed train was built on the original foreign standard. The 
first Chinese CRH380A was built in 2015 only in 2015. 
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CRRC for RMB 2.4 billion (full ownership). The first acquisition was to obtain 
access to IGBT power module technology, while the latter was to obtain shock 
absorbing rubber technology154.  
CRRC had set up 9 overseas R&D centers to work on leading foreign rail 
technology. It runs a corporate central research station, 8 national key engineering 
laboratories, 4 professional research institutes, 4 national engineering technology 
research centers, and 20 national level corporate technology centers. The research 
budget in 2015 was RMB 9.95 billion or 4.2% of sales, and almost 10% of its 
190,000 staff worked in R&D155.  
China is not in the cutting edge of rolling stock manufacturing space and 
Made in China 2025 is going to address the problem. The size of CRRC and the 
R&D resources committed will facilitate the catch-up.  
The state of the Chinese railway industry   
Since the introduction of HSR service in 2007, China has built the world's 
most extensive HSR network with operating length more than half of the world's 
total156. China’s HSR can be broken down into 4 sub-groups: the newly built 
passenger designated lines (PDLs) that only provide passenger service; the newly 
built conventional rail lines mostly in western China which can carry high-speed 
passenger and freight trains; certain regional "intercity" HSR lines that are also 
dedicated to passenger service alone; the conventional track railways that were 
                                                            
154In 2015, Chinese government merged CSR and CNR to form CRRC, the company become the 
sole manufacturer of HSR rolling stock in China. 
155CRRC Annual Report 2015. (2016, April 27). Retrieved July 22, 2016, from 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2016/0427/LTN20160427686.pdf 
156 The definition of HSR is based on top speed and many lines are operating at top speed only in a 
short section of its track. In this regard, China’s share of world HSR is often put at more than 60%.   
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upgraded to run mixed passenger and freight lines. Most of the rail lines currently 
under construction belong to one of the first three categories. Nearly all HSR lines 
and rolling stock in China are owned and operated by the CRC157. 
The development of the Chinese HSR took place on a scale beyond anything 
the world has ever seen. In June 2016, the Chinese government again revised the 
2008 railway development plan, envisioning the HSR line to reach 30,000 km and 
national railway length to hit 150,000 km by 2020158. 
Country In operation (km) Under 
construction(km) 
Total country (km) 
 China 19,000 18,155.5 37,155.5 
 Spain 3,100 1,800 4,900 
 Japan 2,664 782 3,446 
 France 2,036 757 2,793 
 Sweden 1,706 0 1,706 
  Turkey 1,420 1,506 2,926 
  United 
Kingdom 
1,377 0 1,377 
  Germany 1,334 428 1,762 
  Italy 923 125 1,048 
  South Korea 819 613 1,432 
Rest of the world 2821 1482 4303 
Total 37200 25648.5 62848.5 
Source: author tabulation 
Fig 69. High Speed Rail in the world as of Dec 2015 
                                                            
157 MOR was dissolved in March 2013 and its railway operating asset was taken over by China 
Railway Corporation (CRC). The policy formulation function was assumed by Ministry of 
Transportation and the government oversight function was taken over by a rail transport board. 
158 Xu, R. (2016). China Construction-RMB 4.7 train transportation infrastructure construction 
plan for 2016-2018. Manuscript, UBS, Hong Kong. 
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Benefits of the Chinese HSR to the economy: 
Aside from the convenience of shorter travel times, the key to the 
successful migration of ordinary train passenger to HSR lies in its affordability159. 
From the perspective of absolute fare to relative fare, the Chinese HSR is below. 
From perspective of both relative fare to income and absolute fare level, figure 71 
and figure 72 indicated that HSR is affordable to the Chinese commuters. 
 
Source: UBS160                 
Fig 70. China HSR train passenger ticket price compared global and China airline 
(US$/km) 
 
                                                            
159 During 2008-2013, total rail passenger volume continued to grow at 7.6% annually, but with a 
change in traffic composition. While conventional rail traffic grew 1.5% annually, HSR traffic has 
increased 39% per annum since 2008. The introduction of CRH services has not caused a 
reduction in ridership on the conventional network, but has instead fuelled accelerated growth, 
which the previous network, close to its full capacity, was unable to serve. 
160 Chan, H. (2016). Prospect of Chinese Rail Export Under "One Belt, One Road" In China's One 
Belt One Road Initiative (pp. 197-236). London, UK: Imperial College Press. 
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Fig 71.  HSR fare as percentage of monthly income per 100km 
 
 The spillover effects of HSR to the efficiency of the economy are very 
positive. Compared to other means of transportation, railway has overall cost 
advantages.  
 
Source: author calculation based on MOR, MOC data as of Jan 2013. All fare in 
RMB/km  
Fig 72. Railway has cost advantage vs. other transportation means 
In terms of energy efficiency, it also compares well with other modes of 
transportation161. 
                                                            
161 Table on energy consumption use SCE (Standard Coal Equivalent) as energy measurement 
unit, 1 SCE=8.14 kwh 
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 Cargo kg  SCE/kt.km Passenger kg 
SCE/person.km 
Ordinary Railway 
(diesel) 
3.6 0.018 
Ordinary Railway 
(electrified) 
1.4 0.007 
High-speed Railway 
(electrified) 
Na 0.01 
Land vehicle 18.2 0.015 
Cars Na 0.043 
Shipping 3.1 na 
Civil Aviation 91 0.068 
Source: logistic Companies, Shipping companies, airline companies, Both Merrill 
Lynch Global Research estimates. 
Fig 73. Energy consumption comparison of the different modes of transportation 
1 standard coal unit = 8.141 kwh 
 
 Traditional economic evaluations of major transport infrastructure focus on 
the direct costs and benefits arising from travel, including user time savings, 
operator cost savings, and reduction of externalities like air pollution, noise, and 
accidents. Wider economic impacts are too tenuous to be reliably quantified and 
therefore often neglected. However, in the years following the adoption of HSR, 
China has surprisingly shown strong economic agglomeration benefits162. This 
significant economic growth effect from agglomeration in favour of city cluster 
encourages the formation of 3 mega growth areas in China: Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei; 
Yangtze River Delta; and Pearl River Delta. China's drive to build intercity HSR in 
recent years is quite unique in the world HSR construction history. This reflects that 
economic agglomeration effects in China is becoming more and more apparent.     
                                                            
162 In economies, agglomeration are the benefits that firms obtain by locating near each other. This 
concept relates to the idea of economies of scale and network effects. As more firms in related 
fields of business cluster together, their costs of production may decline significantly (firms have 
competing multiple suppliers; greater specialization and division of labor result). Even when 
competing firms in the same sector cluster, there may be advantages because the cluster attracts 
more suppliers and customers than a single firm could achieve alone. 
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 A World Bank study noted the unusually strong contribution of HSR to 
China's regional economic development, urbanization and industrial upgrading163. 
Although benefits from these three areas are too early to be quantifiable, Chinese 
experience does show a dynamic interaction of properly executed transportation 
infrastructure and economic growth in both short to long term. Chinese successes 
in HSR have drawn the attention of many developing countries. 
 An interesting technology spillover area from China's development in HSR 
is in the area of urban rail transport. Urban rail transport includes subway and light 
rail, with tram and maglev being an insignificant player. China has intensified urban 
rail transport infrastructure investments to improve the city traffic conditions. Cost 
estimates based on approved lines show that China in general spent around RMB 
500-700 million/km (USD 80-110 million/km) on city subway construction. This 
figure is very low by international standards and most observers believe that the 
Chinese civil work and rolling stock contractors achieved such efficiency through 
the learning curve from the HSR construction. By the end of 2015, 23 Chinese cities 
are running their urban subway rail networks and China will expand its urban rail 
network significantly in the next few years164 . Figures below shows the Unit 
investment of urban rail transit and operating length of urban rail transit system in 
China. Recently announced Chinese plan confirmed the expansion of urban rail 
system to at least 8000 km by 2020. 
 
                                                            
163 Andrew Salzberg, Richard Bullock, Ying Jin and Wanli Fang, “High-speed rail, regional 
economics and urban development in China”, World Bank Office (Beijing), China transport 
topics, No. 08, January 2013 
164 23 cities running subway are Beijing, Changsha, Chongqing, Chengdu, Dalian, 
Guangzhou/Foshan, Hangzhou, Harbin, Hong Kong, Kunming, Nanjing, Nanchang, Ningbo, 
Qingdao, Shanghai, Shenyang, Shenzhen, Suzhou, Tianjin, Wuhan, Wuxi, Xian, Zhengzhou.   
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Source: UBS estimate.165 All price in RMB/km 
Fig 74. Unit investment in RMB/km for Urban Rail Transit 
 
Source: UBS estimate. 166 
Fig 75. Operating Length of the Urban Rail Transit System in 
China 
                                                            
165 Chan, H. (2016). Prospect of Chinese Rail Export Under "One Belt, One Road" In China's One 
Belt One Road Initiative (pp. 197-236). London, UK: Imperial College Press. 
166 Xu, R. (2016). China Construction-RMB 4.7 train transportation infrastructure construction 
plan for 2016-2018. Manuscript, UBS, Hong Kong 
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Source: UBS estimate167 
Fig 76. Past and planned Fixed Asset Investment on urban and railway in China 
Innovations in the Chinese HSR industry  
 There are four major players in the global HSR industry: Japan (1964), 
France (1981), Germany (1991) and China (2007)168. In contrast to the first three 
countries that develop the HSR technology through independent research and 
development, the Chinese used a different strategy to develop HSR technology. It 
first built a local technological base, then skillfully introduced foreign technology 
to fill the knowledge gap, absorbed and improved the foreign technology, and then 
combined with indigenous improvement to build a more efficient industry. 
Industry experts often use the maximum train speed as a generation 
definition for HSR. The first generation 1G train runs between 200-300 km/h, 2G 
train runs around 300 km/h and 3G train runs around 350 km/h. Following this 
definition, we noted that China had compressed its transition from 1G to 3G in three 
                                                            
167 Ibid. 
168 Parenthesis indicate the year in which the first HSR line operates in that country.  
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years using initially CRH1, CRH2, CRH5 in 1G and CRH 380A, CRH 380B in 3G 
(2007-2010) as against Japan’s transition of 47 years (1964-2011), France’s 
transition of 27 years (1981-2008) and Germany’s transition of 15 years (1991-
2006).  
Generation Japan France Germany China 
 Model   Max. 
Speed (year 
introduced)  
Model   Max. 
Speed (year 
introduced) 
Model    Max. 
Speed (year 
introduced) 
Model    Max. 
Speed (year 
introduced) 
1G S-0 210km/h        
(1964) 
S-100 210km/h 
(1975) 
E-2 275km/h 
(1997) 
TGV-PSE              
280km/h (1981) 
TGV-A 
300km/h (1989) 
ICE-1       
250km/h (1991) 
ICE-2          
280km/h (1996) 
CRH1            
200km/h 
CRH2            
200km/h 
CRH5            
200km/h 
Imported 1G 
2G S-500 300km/h 
(1998) 
TGV-
Mediterranee        
320km/h 
TGV-EST 
(2001) 
320km/h (2007) 
ICE-3       
300km/h (2002) 
(Valaro) 
CRH2            
300km/h 
CRH3            
300km/h 
350km/h EST 
                      
(2008) 
Developed 2G 
3G Fastech 360         
(2011) 
Reduced to 
320km/h, as E5 
was put in 
service 
AGV360 
(2008) 
Tested 360km/h 
EST in Italy, by 
2013 (not over) 
300km/h EST 
ICE350E              
(2006) 
Tested 350km/h 
EST in Spanish 
(not in service) 
 
CRH380-A 
CRH380-B 
(2010) 
350-380km/h 
In service 
Created 3G 
 
Source: author tabulation  
Figure 77-Timeline of technology development for HSR train around the world 
 
China exploits both the inefficiency of its global peers and its natural 
economics of scale and late comer advantages to overcome the disadvantage of 
insufficient technical experience in one of the most technically intensive and safety 
centric industry169.  
                                                            
169 There are more than 12000 mechanical parts in a high speed running train and the Chinese 
name of CRH (hexie-和谐) means that the train parts should work in harmony. Also the 
consequence of a running high speed train accident is fatal.  
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While the attention on HSR system often falls on the train speed, China’s 
global peers all failed to take action on their country’s track design in 
complementing the dynamic running condition of a high-speed train. In the case of 
Japan, its maximum line spacing between parallel track is set at 4.3 meter-4.5 meter, 
turning ratio is set at 4-5 km, and tunnel diameter at 8 meter. This restricts the 
maximum speed that train can run in many aerodynamic sensitive areas. In the case 
of France, it did not use elevated viaduct extensively in its line and the roadbed 
system restricted the turning ratio. Hence this restricts the maximum speed where 
trains can also run in many areas. In the case of Germany, though it pioneered many 
infrastructure parameters to improve train-track coordination, it often failed to 
provide for dedicated high speed passenger track lines for the whole route. 
Passenger dedicated high speed train run at high speed track in some parts of the 
route and then slowdown at the upgraded conventional track when it reaches that 
section. The incoordination of track and train hamper the speed transition of Japan, 
France and German trains from 1G to 2G to 3G170,171. 
 The absence of a good track infrastructure placed all the system 
adjustments on the running trainset system. This incoordination reflects the absence 
of a centrally organized system setup at the beginning. While China is a late comer, 
it had noted all the earlier problems of its peer. Its track parameters reflect the 
optimum compatibility of train and track172.  
                                                            
170 Liu, X., Zhao, P., & Dai, F. (2011, September). Advances in design theories of high-speed 
railway ballastless tracks. Journal of Modern Transportation, 19(3), 154-162. 
171 Minimum Railway Curve Radius. (n.d.). Retrieved July 21, 2016, from 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Minimum_railway_curve_radius 
172 Wang, J. (2011, May 4). The Ballastless Track Technology For China High-Speed Line. 
Lecture presented at High Speed Rail Technology. 
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The unique Chinese track parameter and design criteria place a serious 
challenge on implementation and credit should be given to the Chinese for 
overcoming them. China had successfully localized the slab rail bed system and 
develop cost efficient viaduct/tunnel construction method173.  Hence   the Chinese 
HSR system run at higher average speed than its global peers. Better track-train 
compatibility also improves the riding comfort and safety of the train174,175. 
The successful adoption and improvement of imported technology plus the 
development of complementary construction techniques put the Chinese HSR 
industry in a strong comparative cost position. World Bank (WB) provided the 
earlier financing to some of the HSR projects and it probably has the best cost factor 
data aside from Chinese government. WB pointed out that China has a commanding 
cost advantage in turnkey HSR system, unit cost of PDL (passenger dedicated line) 
in Chinese HSR is about 1/3 to 2/3 to those of other countries176.  
                                                            
173 It is estimated that the average viaduct length of a typical Chinese HSR line is around 55%, the 
use of viaduct and no ballast slab rail bed system solve many speed restricting design problems.  
174 A recent field test for CRH380A reveals at 486.1 km/h, the derailment coefficient is only 02 as 
against the security norm of 0.8, the ride quality indexes are 1.8 and 2.0 against the standards of 
2.0 and 2.5 in lateral and vertical directions. The emergency brake distance at 380 km/h is 5908 m 
against the required 6500 meter.  
175  China use ballastless tracks that do not use rock material to stabilize them and also the entire 
line is seamless. The track construction required a lot of research work due to varying temperature 
across the rail line. The Chinese HSR are nearly all set in concrete slab which reduce wear and tear 
on the wheels and tracks.  
176 Gerald Olivier, Jitendra Sondhi and Nanyan Zhou, "High-speed railways in China: A look at 
construction costs", World Bank office (Beijing), China Transport Topics, No. 09, July 2014 
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Source-World Bank data177 
Fig 78. Unit cost of HSR (RMB/km) based on estimated cost at the time of project 
approval 
 
 WB identified two main reasons behind the Chinese cost advantage178. The 
first is the standardization of design of various construction elements which 
significantly enhances construction efficiency, and the second is the development 
of innovative & competitive capacity for manufacture of equipment. 
 World Bank cost analysis shows that construction cost is the most 
significant cost component in HSR project as shown in fig 80. China has used its 
scale advantage and developed a standardized design for various construction 
elements that significantly lowers costs. Figure 80 below is an example of such 
standardization of two specialized equipment developed on viaduct construction.      
                                                            
177 Chan, H. (2016). Prospect of Chinese Rail Export Under "One Belt, One Road" In China's One 
Belt One Road Initiative (pp. 197-236). London, UK: Imperial College Press. 
178 Gerald Olivier, Jitendra Sondhi and Nanyan Zhou, "High-speed railways in China: A look at 
construction costs", World Bank office (Beijing), China Transport Topics, No. 09, July 2014 
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Figure 79 below shows the typical track civil work cost and the relatively small 
premium of viaduct over embankment cost as well as the low price of track.  
 Element 350km/h 250km/h 200km/h 
Land acquisition and 
resettlement 
4 4-8 6-9 
Civil works 48 50-54 44-51 
     Embankment 6 7-12 13-15 
     Bridges/Viaducts 41* 13-25 25-27 
     Tunnels 0* 16-29 2-13 
Track 9 9-11 6-7 
Signal and 
communications 
4 3 4 
Electrification 5 4-5 4-5 
Rolling stock 15 3-4 5-7 
Buildings including 
stations 
2 2-4 3-5 
Other costs Balance Balance Balance 
*An exception is Shizheng Railway that has 69 percent of viaduct accounting for 
41 percent of cost and no tunnels. 
Source- World Bank data179 
Fig 79. Percentage of total project cost based on World Bank financed HSR lines 
 
 
Fig 80. Specialized beam carrier & launching equipment used in  high speed rail 
viaduct construction 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
179 Ibid. 
Beam Carrier Beam Launching Equipment 
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Element 350km/h 250km/h 200km/h 
Land acquisition and 
resettlement 
4 5-9 5-8 
Civil works 57 56-62 42-43 
Embankment 24 31-42 42-43 
Bridges/Viaducts 71 57-73 59-62 
Tunnels -- 60-95 51-68 
Track    
     Track(ballast-less)* 10 10-13 -- 
     Track(ballasted)* -- -- 5-7 
Signal and 
communications 
5 3 3-4 
Electrification 6 4-5 4 
*Ballast-less slab track is under for 360 and 250km/h PDLs while ballasted track 
is employed for 200km/h railways. 
Source: PSR /PAD for projects. World Bank data180 
Fig 81. Range of average unit construction costs of HSR lines financed by World 
Bank 
(RMB in million per km of double track) 
 
 China HSR with a maximum speed of 350 km/h has a typical infrastructure 
cost of about USD 17-21million/km, with a high ratio of viaducts and tunnels. 
Similar construction in Europe, having design speed of 300 km/h, is in the order of 
USD 25-39 million/km. The figure is estimated to be as high as USD 52million/km 
for California. Chinese contractors have delivered projects within budget & 
construction time frames under the most difficult terrain conditions as shown in 
Table 5181. Budget overruns and delays are extremely rare182. For instance, World 
bank financed 857 km Guiyang-Guangzhou line traverses 270 tunnels and 510 
valleys across the geographically difficult landscapes in Guizhou took only 6 years 
                                                            
180 Ibid. 
181 The Guiyang - Guangzhou line is 1856km long with 83% of the tracks in tunnels & bridges, its 
maximum design speed of 250km/h. The project is completed in 5 years with the cost capped at 
RMB147m/km 
182 There is a delay of several months on project completion post July 2011 Wenzhou train 
accident, the government ordered a review of all projects under construction. However, all lines 
are finished on budget. 
 ‐ 141 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
to complete with the final budget amended to RMB 94.6 billion on completion from 
initial budget of RMB 85.8billion estimated seven years earlier.     
 Max. Speed Km/h/type Length Km Total estimated 
cost RMB b 
Unit cost 
RMB 
m/km 
Bridges + 
Viaduct + 
Tunnels 
(% of route 
km) 
Period of 
construction 
Shijiazhuang-
Zhengzhou 
360 PDL 366 43.9 123 69 2008-2012 
Guiyang-
Guangzhou 
250 PDL 857 94.6 110 80 2008-2014 
Jilin-
Hunchun 
250 PDL 360 39.6 110 66 2010-2014 
Zhangjiakou-
Hohhot 
250 PDL 286 34.6 121 67 2013-2017 
Nanning-
Guangzhou 
200 Mixed 463 41.0 89 53 2008-2014 
Harbin-
Jiamusi 
200 Mixed 343 33.9 99 48 2014-2017 
PDL-passenger dedicated line; Mixed- passenger/cargo combo line 
Notes: 1. Total project cost includes the cost of project preparation, and acquisition of the railway 
and regular stations, con…., rolling stock and interest during construction. The cost of railway 
excluding cost of project preparation, rolling stock and interest during construction is estimated at 
about 82 percent of the total cost. 
2. Cost Reference: GG-Revised FSR Dec. 2010, MG-PAD May 2009, Shi-Zheng PAD May 2008, 
Jitchun-PAD 2011, Zhang-Hu-FSR, Halia-Revised Feasibility Study OC 2012/PAD. 
Source: World Bank183 
Fig 82. Railway Projects Supported by the World Bank in China 
 
 The extensive HSR construction in China provides valueble construction 
experience to the Chinese railway builder: the 904 km Harbin-Dalian HSR line and 
1776 km Lanzhou-Xinjiang HSR are all considered engineering wonders184,185.  
Many observers put the civil work expertise of China in railway construction, 
                                                            
183 Gerald Olivier, Jitendra Sondhi and Nanyan Zhou, "High-speed railways in China: A look at 
construction costs", World Bank office (Beijing), China Transport Topics, No. 09, July 2014 
 
 
184 Harbin-Dalian is the world's first alpine high speed railway operating at high latitude and low 
temperature. The train route operates under a minimum of -40oC to a maximum 40oC temperature 
conditions at a maximum speed of 350km/h in summer and 250 km/h in winter 
185 The line is the first desert running HSR that goes through desert wind zone. It pass through 
3607 altitude tunnel along the way and it is the highest operating HSR.   
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particularly in HSR construction, as the most significant comparative advantage it 
enjoys in global railway construction market. It is interesting to note that in the 
aborted 210 km Mexico-Queretaro HSR project, China was the sole bidder as the 
construction period of 2.5 year to 3 year will not be met by all other international 
competitors. Interest accumulated during construction is a major cost component 
for major infrastructure projects and the Chinese ability to materially shorten 
construction period is a major source of competitive advantage.  
 The second important cost advantage of China lies on its development of 
innovative and competitive capacity manufacturing of equipment 186 . Chinese 
rolling stock generally costs around one-half to two-third to that of international 
competitors187. Comparisons based on Figure 84 below on global system cost 
between 2009 and that of China on 2011. China's design fee and rolling stock cost 
is much lower than the comparative global standard. Apparently, the scale effect 
plus the innovation skills of the designers and equipment manufacturers are the 
main reasons behind the cost savings. China has managed to develop innovative 
and competitive capacity for manufacture of equipment188. 
                                                            
186 Zhang Yu张瑜，HSR promote local industries"高铁出海激浪环球大潮 国产化推进激发 6
股巨大空间"，中国证券报，19 December 2014, www.yicai.com/news/2014/12/4054254.html 
187 Jacqueline Li, "LT outlook positive; Buy CSR, new neutral CNR", Rail equipment - China, 
Bank of America Merrill Lynch, 21 October 2014 
188 Zhang Yu张瑜，HSR promote local industries "高铁出海激浪环球大潮 国产化推进激发 6
股巨大空间"，中国证券报，19 December 2014 
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Source: UBS189 
Fig 83. Breakdown of cost segments in HSR construction 
 
 During the 3rd quarter of 2015, China released a complete set of Technical 
Standard on the HSR. The standard puts China HSR as the fourth international HSR 
standard – on par with Germany’s ICE, France’s TGV and Japan’s Shinkansen. The 
Chinese HSR system adopts the TGV and ICE systems, generally acknowledged to 
be more superior than the Shinkansen, in the area of electrical system. This adoption 
significantly improved the reliability of Chinese HSR. The Chinese standard also 
has a high degree of compatibility with TGV and ICE in terms of electrical system.  
 Various innovations in the Chinese HSR helped to build the Chinese HSR 
industry and firmly put it as one of the major contenders in the international HSR 
business. However, due to the large cost of investment, the Chinese HSR will 
continue to serve only the mainland market and remain as a domestic industry in 
the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the ideal choice of an independent HSR line is 
a transport corridor of less than 1000 km with annual passenger volume of around 
                                                            
189 Xu, R. (2016). China Construction-RMB 4.7 train transportation infrastructure construction 
plan for 2016-2018. Manuscript, UBS, Hong Kong 
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10-20 million190, and not many city pairs in the world fit the description. Although 
the EU certification standard is cumbersome and has a high barrier of entry, Europe 
is the biggest market for HSR and its spending on HSR equipment is even more 
than China’s191. The prospect for the associated urban rail industry is much brighter- 
CRRC having won the Boston and Chicago subway railcar replacement in 2014 and 
2016. The increasing urbanization and worsening urban traffic condition are 
favorable to the development of the urban rail system. In 2015, CRRC won close 
to USD 6 billion worth of export contract and it was the world’s biggest rolling 
stock exporter since 2013192. 
  
Analysis of the Chinese HSR industry using the technological regime 
framework 
 To analyze the emergence of the Chinese HSR system, we developed the 
following model based on the neo-Schumpeterian technical regime. 
Here, we used the four parameters of technical regime to analyze the 
Chinese HSR industry. 
1. Opportunities (OPP) 
The ccontinuously strong political and financial support from the 
government is a key factor behind the success of the HSR industry. The technical 
choice, standard setting, 2004 importation of foreign technology with local 
technology transfer and local manufacturing condition, as well as the formation of 
                                                            
190 A new criterion for point to point distance is the travel time of four hours.  At 300 km/h running 
speed, any two point that is 1200 km apart with sufficient passenger volume is ideal for HSR.  
191 CRC formed a partnership with Siemens in June, 2016 to work on joint bidding of HSR project. 
192 CRRC Annual Report 2015. (2016, April 27). Retrieved July 22, 2016, from 
http://www.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/SEHK/2016/0427/LTN20160427686.p 
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a local research team between MOST and MOR, are all government policy 
initiatives which are critical in the successful localization of imported technology. 
Of course, one should not overlook the policy risk of these government 
initiatives. The innovative government approach  was successful because China has 
a capable and vast talent pool to learn and innovate. The HSR industry is a system-
integration industry that draws on technology and knowhow from various areas of 
science and engineering. If not for the existing strong R&D capabilities already 
present in its rail sector, China is not likely to succeed. The successful adoption  of 
foreign technologies and subsequent indigenous technological breakthrough builds 
up the Chinese HSR industry.  
The interational collaboration with leading countries, including Japan, 
France and Germany, also provided the Chines rail manufacturers with important 
opportunities to learn different HSR technologies193. 
2. Appropriability (APP) 
The HSR industry is lead by the CRRC and most of the major companies in 
the industry are SOEs. The government’s long term commitment provides the 
reward opportunity to these industry players.  
3. Cumulativeness (CUM) 
Before 2004, the failure of the development attempt of an indigenous high 
speed train taught Chinese engineers valuable lessons. This was corrected when 
they decided to import foreign technology in 2004 for their technology specification. 
                                                            
193  The Chinese negotiator in the 2004 HSR technology importation remarked that China only 
spend around RMB 2.3-2.5 billion to get all the technology transfer agreement of the four trainset 
introduced to China. The HSR industry worldwide at that time is just recovering from the 2000 
dotcom bubble.  
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Without a solid R&D base in rail technology, the unprecedented speed transition of 
Chinese train technology from 1G to 3G was unlikely to happen. 
While China has succeeded in the HSR industry, its short history and lack 
of cumulativeness in certain areas in the industry is now being addressed in Made 
in China 2025. These areas are  traction system control, traction motor, components, 
bogie and network control. 
In contrary to other countries’ experience of striving to setup new industries, 
the challenge of earlier accumulated knowledge does not seem to be critical in the 
case of China. The size of the existing industry as well as the presence of quality 
R&D personnel means China does possess a good degree of accumulated 
knowledge in virtually all industries. 
4. Knowledge Base (BAS) 
The HSR’s train car and track are designed to run for 30 and 50 years 
respectively. With more than 12,000 mechanical parts in a train set and more than 
1,000 sensors monitoring different functions in train operations, the industry is also 
highly system-integrated. The knowledge base in the industry is broad and varied, 
but at the same time, specified. The long life and delicate nature of the product 
imply that the entry barrier is exceptionally high, and a lot of complementary 
technologies are needed to put the innovation to use. Hence, it is not surprising to 
see only four major countries in the global HSR market, namely China, France, 
Germany and Japan.  
Similar to cumulativeness in the technological regime, China’s challenge on 
knowledge base is mute and the Chinese experience is contrary to conventional 
wisdom. As late as 2012, there is still much pessisism regarding the Chinese HSR 
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industry. However, the presence of a huge R&D pool in various different 
knowledge field and the organizational power of the government to pull all the 
resources together  to work out the indigenous technological are the two key factors 
in the building up of the HSR industry. 
Alternative foreign technological acquisition route: 
 A fast catching up technological ascending country always faces 
increasing barrier in acquring new technologies from its former foreign technology 
provider. The model on technology and market development in figure 67 face a gap 
on the link between government policies and foreign source technology 
opprotunities under the circumstances.   The critical choke point to the successful 
replication of the model in other industries under Made in China 2025 is the 
technological learning opportunity from foreign source technology 194,195. 
The alternatives to preserve the working of the model will come from 
increasing reliance on indigenous innovations that can meaningfully lessen the 
relative weight of foreign technology to complete learning opportunities on 
catching up/leapfrogging. At the same time, the country must develop alternative 
foreign technologies learning opportunity route from the vanishing cheap 
technology transfer agreement opportunities under the 2004/2005 HSR deals196. 
                                                            
194 Rho, S., Lee, K., & Kim, S. (2015). Limited Catch-Up in China's Semiconductor Industry: A 
Sectoral Innovation System Perspective. Millennial Asia, 6(2), 1-29. 
195 Mu, Q., & He, X. (2012). How Chinese firms learn technology from transnational corporations: 
A comparison of the telecommunication and automobile industries. Journal of Asian 
Economics, 23, 270-287.  
196 The foreign suppliers are obviously caught by surprise on the speed of technology assimilation 
& innovation in the HSR industry. Italy, Spain, South Korea and Taiwan all introduce HSR to 
their rail system and they were only able to build component and assemble industry from the 
technology transfer, no one was able to build a meaningful complete industry up. These countries 
are supposedly more technological advance than China.  
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Earlier discussion at micro-level showed that China has developed the 
domestic industrial base which has a certain degree of technology accumulation and 
general knowledge base in other industries under Made in China 2025 plan. China’s 
increasingly indigenous R&D capacity based on the current 3.7 million R&D staffs 
has rapidly improved in quality, as witnessed by the unprecedented ascension of its 
nature index ranking 197 . China has a huge domestic market to support its 
appropriation of reward to innovators and the government has a proven long term 
view and execution power on industrial development198. 
At the moment, the most common routes for China to acquire advanced 
foreign source technological opportunities are through setting up of research 
laboratories overseas and merger & acquisition (M&A) of choice foreign 
technology company. For example, Huawei has set up ten overseas research 
laboratories. They had provided critical technology to their mother company in 
China. Geely’s acquisition of Volvo and Midea’s acquisition of Kuka are also 
notable successes. These new foreign source technology opportunities will plug the 
missing link in the model, and complete the innovation opportunity for the Chinese 
industries under Made in China 2025. 
The increasing indigenous R&D human resources simply means that 
Chinese reliance on foreign technology acquisition as the primary method of 
technology advancement is decreasing and the country’s technology acquisition is 
                                                            
197 Leng, S. (2016, July 29). Science’s rising stars: China’s researchers make big leaps in 
contributions to top journals. Retrieved July 29, 2016, from 
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1996154/sciences-rising-stars-chinas-researchers-make-
big-leaps-contributions-top 
198 Kurlantzick, J. (2016). China's State Capitalism. In State Capitalism (pp. 93-114). New York, 
US: Oxford University Press. 
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increasingly domestic199.  The biggest telecom company in the world, Huawei200 is 
the most notable success story in this case.  
Examining the model on technology and market innovation on HSR in 
China in figure 67 showed that the conditions necessary for the continuing working 
of the model in the other industries has not materially change with the development 
of alternative foreign technology route and increasing shifting of technology 
acquisition route from foreign source to domestic origination. The Chinese 
government appears to follow this development model when it set up the China 
Aero-Engine Corporation to speed up development of jet engine 201. 
Summary of Findings at meso-level: 
 Analysis of the Chinese HSR industry’s success using the 4 technological 
regime framework factors saw two critical elements behind the successful 
emergence of the industry. These two elements appear in the left column of the 
model and they are the initiating block in the model:  
(1) Strong institution that can provide the political and financial support to 
build the industry and reward the innovators. In China’s case, the government is the 
institution. In South Korea, it is a combination of chaebol and the government. In 
the west, it is private capitalists.  
                                                            
199 The success of Huawei as the largest telecom company in the world shown the R&D ability of 
the indigenous researchers. The company only access foreign technology in its formative year by 
hiring former Shanghai Bell Laboratory employee to develop its first generation telephone 
exchange. All subsequent R&D are in‐house.  
200 Fox, J. (2016, July 26). Huawei Conquers the World, Except the U.S. Retrieved July 29, 2016, 
from http://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-26/huawei-conquers-the-world-except-
the-u-s 
201 China formed China Aero-Engine Corporation in July 2016 to address the delay in high power 
aero engine development. The company is akin to CRRC and was proven effective in the case of 
HSR industry development.  
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(2) Successful technological innovation requires a solid industry base and 
R&D capability. Cumulating specify industry level knowhow and building industry 
innovation capacity requires capable R&D talents. The more science-based the 
industry, the larger talent pool one needs. 
The meso-level analysis demonstrates these two critical factors behind the 
success of the HSR model are intact at present. China has developed alternative 
routes to acquire foreign technologies and is increasing the contribution of domestic 
technologies in its industrial innovation effort. The effective HSR development 
model remain workable today despite the different economic conditions in mid-
2000s and that of today.  
Our findings indicated that the pre-conditions for the continuing working of 
the proven HSR innovation model based on neo-Schumpeterian analysis still exist 
today and China had demonstrated the ability to implement the model. Thus the 
country possesses the necessary pre-condition to succeed at the meso-level of neo-
Schumpeterian Economics.  
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Chapter 6 - Research Findings at the macro-level of neo-Schumpeterian 
Analysis: 
The role of government in economic development under neo-Schumpeterian 
Economics is extensive. It is expected to actively promote the national capacity 
building at micro-level, and formulate and implement industrial policy at the meso-
level.  While the micro-level national capacity building is one of the key universal 
economic functions of all government, the active involvement at industrial level is 
a distinguishing feature of neo-Schumpeterian Economics. In fact, the involvement 
at industrial development makes neo-Schumpeterian economics akin to the famous 
East Asian Model202. 
 The involvement of government at the meso-level establishment of new 
industries focuses on two areas: The first area is to facilitate the technology learning 
opportunities and provide the initial appropriation incentives under the 
technological regime framework. The second area is to facilitate the appropriate 
linkages to solve the cumulativeness and knowledge base problems facing the 
nascent industry.  
 In the first area, the government often set up public research facilities, acquire 
advance foreign technologies, improve the imported technology and then localize 
them to help the players in the nascent industry.  The government also promote the 
material incentives to the nascent industry by acting as their initial anchor customer 
and directly or indirectly channelling subsidies to keep the initially struggling new 
players in the industry.   
                                                            
202 Lee, K. (2013). Introduction. In Schumpeterian Analysis of Economic Catch-up (pp. 3-24). 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge. 
 
 ‐ 152 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
In the second area, the government ‘s role in linking different technology 
sectors together to overcome obstacles facing the nascent industry in 
cumulativeness and knowledge base issues under technological regime framework 
had proven to be effective in building a new industry. The experience of HSR in 
the indigenous technological breakthrough that we recounted in chapter 5 highlights 
this point.  
 
Introduction to Findings: 
 We will look at the technological learning curve traversed by China and then 
proceed to the elements that we will use in the macro-level analysis.  
China’s technological learning curve essentially follows that of other Asian 
countries’. At the beginning, it is concentrated on original equipment 
manufacturing (OEM), learning operational skills and processing technology from 
more advanced countries. It then moved to own design manufacturing (ODM), after 
developing certain in-house design skills. Now, it is trying to move into own brand 
manufacturing (OBM), with indigenous new product development capabilities203. 
What sets China apart from other Asian countries is the speed with which its 
technological learning curve is being shortened, and the scale at which this is 
happening.  
Similar to other technological adoption mechanisms of the Asian tiger 
economies, China acquired foreign technologies from foreign direct investment 
(FDI), co-developed with foreign R&D specialist firms, set up overseas R&D posts 
                                                            
203 Lee, K., (2005). Making a Technological Catch-Up: Barriers & Opportunities. Asian Journal of 
chnological Innovation, 13(27), 97-131.  
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to access foreign technologies, and joined the government-sponsored private-public 
R&D consortia to facilitate entry to new sectors204. 
To evaluate whether China possesses the pre-conditions to succeed in Made in 
China 2025 at the macro-level of neo-Schumpeterian analysis, we examine the role 
that the government play in fostering the national capacity building at the micro-
level and its activities at the meso-level in helping some nascent industries to 
overcome constraints imposed by technological regime.  
Findings: 
       At the micro-level, the government effort on developing national innovation 
capacity is expanding.  
       The Chinese government had developed an indigenous R&D capability since 
its opening of 1978, and rapid expansion of R&D personnel and spending in the 
21st century had contributed to the economic growth significantly. The continuing 
expansion of R&D capacity is notable and more results are expected down the road. 
Year Total Government funds 
Self-raised funds 
by enterprises Foreign funds Other funds 
2004 196.6 52.4 129.1 2.5 12.6 
2006 300.3 74.2 207.4 4.8 13.9 
2008 461.6 108.9 331.1 5.7 15.8 
2010 706.3 169.6 506.3 9.2 21.1 
2011 868.7 188.3 642.1 11.6 26.7 
2012 1,029.80 222.1 762.5 10 35.2 
2013 1,184.70 250.1 883.8 10.6 40.3 
2014 1,301.60 263.6 981.7 10.8 45.6 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2015. 
 
Fig 84. China’s R&D Expenditure by Source (Billion yuan) 
 
                                                            
204 Lee, K., (2013). How to build up technological capabilities. In Schumpeterian Analysis of 
Economic Catch-up (pp. 153-177). Cambridge University Press. 
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Year Total Basic 
Research 
Applied 
Research 
Product 
development 
2000 922.1 79.6 219.6 622.8 
2002 1,035.1 84.0 247.3 703.9 
2004 1,152.6 110.7 278.6 763.3 
2006 1,502.5 131.3 299.7 1,071.4 
2008 1,965.4 154.0 289.4 1,522.0 
2010 2,553.8 173.7 335.6 2,044.6 
2011 2,882.9 193.2 352.8 2,337.3 
2012 3,246.8 212.2 383.8 2,650.9 
2013 3,532.8 223.2 395.6 2,914.0 
2014 3,710.6 235.4 407.0 3,068.2 
Data source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2015. 
 
Fig 85. Full-time Equivalent of R&D Personnel (1,000 person-year) 
              
        The expanding effort on R&D had contributed meaningfully to economic 
growth. 
 
 Average annual growth 
rate 
GDP 
Contribution of 
Technological 
Progress (%) 
1999-2004 9.2 42.2 
2004-2009 10.6 48.4 
2009-2014 8.5 54.2 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2015. 
 
Fig 86. Contribution of Technological Progress to Economic Growth 
 
              
           In R&D, China draws favourable comparison now with developed countries. 
China looks like a developed country in terms of R&D power and does not resemble 
a developing country. A developing country normally spend less than 1% of GDP 
on R&D. The rate of increases in R&D spending as a percentage of GDP resembling 
the Japan experience in 1960s and 1970s, South Korea experience in 1980s and 
1990s. The increase is a tell-tale sign of full fledge take-off in industrial innovations.  
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  China Germany Japan Korea UK US -2014 -2013 -2013 -2012 -2013 -2012 
R&D Personnel             
  R&D personnel 
(1,000 persons) 5,352 604.6 865.5 396 362.1 -- 
  R&D personnel 
per 10,000 
workers 
69 143 134 160 121 -- 
  % in Enterprise 
sector 78.1 62 67.5 71.1 45.8 -- 
  % in government 
sector 10.1 16.2 7.1 8.3 4.7 -- 
  % in higher 
education sector 9 21.8 24 19.5 47.9 -- 
  % in other 
sectors 2.8 -- 1.4 1.1 1.7 -- 
R&D Expenditure             
  % of GDP 2.05 2.94 3.49 4.36 1.63 2.77 
  % financed by 
industry 75.4 67.8 75.5 74.7 46.5 59.1 
  % financed by 
government 20.3 14.7 17.3 23.8 27 30.8 
  % financed by 
other sources  4.3 17.5 7.2 1.4 26.5 10.1 
Research Output             
  Number of 
papers indexed by 
ESI* 
1,369,834 900,112 804,677 389,181 805,372 34,543,554
  Global Rank 2 3 5 12 4 1 
  Number of 
citations per paper 7.57 14.58 11.1 8.19 16.19 16.58 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology 2015. 
Note: *reported are data from Essential Science Indicators, from January 2004 to April 2014. 
Fig 87. International Comparison of R&D Activities 
 
 
The Chinese government continues the political support to the science 
community. During the May 30, 2016 National Conference on Science and 
Technology (the second one in Chinese history that the meeting is held together 
with the biennial meeting of Academy of Science and Academy of Engineering), 
President Xi declared that innovation-driven development will be China’s hallmark 
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policy. He committed the country to concentrate human and financial resources on 
mission-oriented science and technology programmes such Made in China 2025. 
To him, the ability to pool resource is a particular advantage of China.  
President Xi has announced a number of plans to build a more favourable 
working environment and a well-functioning ecosystem for innovation. The move 
will provide the software support for innovation, and complement the existing 
hardware resources that the government had set up 205 . The government had 
announced that developing the human resources and organization for implementing 
Made in China 2025 is the first policy priority in the economic arena (人才领先). 
This policy announcement is similar to that of policy recommendation of neo-
Schumpeterian Economics. Moreover, the commitment of the state provides the 
solid macro-foundation for success for Made in China 2025 plan. 
On the issue of industrial policy at meso-level, China had demonstrated 
outstanding skill on its formulation and implementation. The surge of Chinese 
economy has revived the interest on state capitalism. Many scholars had noted that 
the Chinese growth is not simply a result of its large and enterprising population. 
The success is also due to the careful economic strategy and its relatively forward 
looking, tough economic decision making government206. The success of the HSR 
model initiated by the government is a tangible proof of the industrial policy 
formulation and implementation capacity. 
Our investigation shows that two factors stand out in the successful emergence 
of China’s HSR industry. Firstly, a strong institution must be present to provide 
                                                            
205 Zhao, L. (n.d.). China's Innovation-Driven Development Under Xi Jinping (pp. 1-18, Rep. No. 
Background Brief). 
206 Kurlantzick, J. (2016). The State is Back in Business. In State Capitalism (pp. 1-26). New 
York, US: Oxford University Press. 
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financial support at the nascent stage, facilitate learning opportunities for foreign 
technology learning and local technology breakthroughs, as well as market access 
once foreign technology adoption happens. In the case of China’s HSR industry, 
the institution is the Chinese government. Secondly, at the industry level, both 
indigenous technological breakthrough, or foreign technology assimilation and 
subsequent innovation over imported technology, depend on the technological 
capability of the existing indigenous firms in the industry and coordination of 
government on the linkages.  
 Aside from the traditional of cheap state funding, subsidized research, market 
support for selected industries under the industrial policy. China has some unique 
technological platforms that no other country has: 
 Market for technology – the Chinese government has actively arranged 
business joint ventures with foreign multinationals and incorporated 
technological transfers into its joint venture agreements. This strategy is 
called market for technology. Though this strategy has not been entirely 
successful, there are cases in which it has worked and contributed 
significantly to China’s advancement. The most notable example is high 
speed rail and telecommunication. The success or failure under market for 
technology is attributed to the technological absorptive capacity of the 
Chinese partner207.   
 Academic-centric forward engineering model - SIPO invention patent data 
shows that Chinese universities own 20% of invention patents. This is the 
                                                            
207 Mu,Q., & He, X. (2012). How Chinese firms learn technology from transitional corporations: A 
comparison of the telecommunication and automobile industries. Journal of Asian Economic, 23, 
270-287.  
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highest ratio of universities holding patents among major countries. Chinese 
universities have set up a number of national champions in many 
technological areas by exploiting their deep technological knowhow, e.g. 
Lenovo (computers), Founder (IT), Tsinghua Unigroup (semiconductor 
design), Dongruan (advance machine tools), and Siasun (robotics). These 
academy-run enterprises are widespread in China and important in many 
high-tech areas. They do not just do reverse engineering (a bottom-up 
process), but also forward engineering (a top-down process). In this model, 
particular academic institutions nurture and develop knowledge until it can 
be commercialized. 
 Going global through international Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) - 
Chinese companies have used this method to gain important technology. To 
name a few, China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation obtained its IGBT 
technology from its acquisition of UK’s Dynex in 2008, and Geely’s 
purchased Volvo in 2010. The M&A model to acquire technology is 
prevalent in developed countries, but is relatively rare for a developing 
country. This year, China stepped up overseas M&A in Germany to acquire 
technology in seven of the ten industries under Made in China 2025208209. 
                                                            
208 Xie, Y. (2016, July 29). Midea emerges from the shadows with Kuka offer. Retrieved July 30, 
2016, from http://www.scmp.com/business/companies/article/1996601/midea-emerges-shadows-
kuka-offer 
209 Germany is a world leader in some key technologies in seven of the ten industries under Made 
in China 2025: Computerized numerical machine tools and robotics, aerospace & aeronautical 
equipment, maritime equipment and high tech. vessel, modern rail equipment, new energy vehicles 
and equipment, power equipment, agricultural equipment  
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Source: South China Morning Post210 
Fig 88. China ‘s acquisition in Germany 
        The Chinese government is much more active today than ever before in the 
pushing of industrial policy. The Made in China 2025 plan is a ten-year plan with 
specific technical target on many areas spill into 2030. This plan is running longer 
and much more detail on specifics than the customary five-year plan. 
Made in China 2025: 
 Made in China 2025 is an industrial development plan with the following 
features: 
 The Made in China 2025 Technological Roadmap (Green Book) is 
comprehensive and contains a fixed set of explicit technological targets. 
This is the basic point of reference when we look at how likely China can 
achieve its goals. 
                                                            
210 Le Corre, P., & Sepulchre, A. (2016, July 15). Why China is investing heavily in Europe. 
Retrieved August 15, 2016, from http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/1944491/why-china-investing-heavily-europe 
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 There are three timelines in the plan: 2020, 2025 and 2030. The technologies 
that China is more certain of normally run for two periods only: 2020 and 
2025. Those that run for three periods are designed to provide more time for 
execution.  
 The more detailed the technological roadmap, the more it indicates the 
drafters’ confidence in the design of the plan. 
 We should note that China excels in areas with very rapid technological 
turnover in the sense of most patent filings in that area, i.e. digital 
communication and computers. It is also strong in most of the electrical 
engineering areas but weak in the chemistry and mechanical engineering 
sectors. The technological innovation goal set in the plan is mostly catch-up 
“creative accumulation” rather than “creative destruction”. Empirically, the 
slower technological turnover of the “creative accumulation” type industries 
are more favourable to determined new comers. 
 The plan itself has several built-in mechanisms for success:  
o The plan is industry-based and is set by academics, industry experts, 
and the government. Targets are subjected to biannual review and 
set close to what the experts on the ground feel comfortable with. 
Take the case of semiconductor fabrication, an area where China is 
weak in and earlier attempts to accelerate innovations were not 
successful 211 . The target set for LSI fabrication is 20-14 nm 
technology in 2019-2025. Intel is fabricating its i-series chip today 
                                                            
211 Rho, S., Lee, K., & Kim, S. (2015). Limited Catch-Up in China’s Semiconductor Industry: A 
Sectoral Innovation System Perspective. Millennial Asia, 6 (2), 1-29. 
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using 14nm Skylake microarchitecture, while Chinese technology is 
two to three generations behind.   
o The three timeline targets are multi-year and allow a high degree of 
flexibility. The targets for semiconductor fabrication are a good case 
in point, as they run from 2019-2025 for the adoption of 20-14 nm 
technology in LSI fabrication. In technological development, eureka 
moments are highly uncertain and setting flexible targets is a more 
realistic way of achieving the targets. 
 Made in China 2025 has set four broad targets for the economy. Their 
success will surely turn China into a more innovative, efficient, digitized 
and green economy. These generic targets are: 
1. On innovation: 
o Large scale manufacturers’ R&D spending to increase from 
0.95% in 2015 to 1.26% in 2020 and 1.68% in 2025. 
o Large scale manufacturers’ patent numbers to increase from 
0.44 per RMB 100m of sales in 2015 to 0.70 in 2020 and 
1.10 in 2025. 
2.  On efficiency: 
o Chinese manufacturers’ competitive index to improve from 
83.5 in 2015 to 84.5 in 2020 and 85.5 in 2025. 
o From 2015 to 2020 and 2015 to 2025, manufacturing value 
added (MVA) to increase by 2% and 4% respectively. 
The annual manufacturing productivity growth rate is set at 7.5% 
from 2016 to 2020, and 6.5% from 2021 to 2025. 
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3.  On digitization: 
o Broadband national coverage to increase from 50% in 2015 
to 70% in 2020 and 84% in 2025. 
o The application of Computer-aided design (CAD) tools to 
increase from 59% in 2015 to 72% in 2020 and 84% in 2025. 
o Digitization of key manufacturing processes is set at 50% in 
2020 and 64% in 2025 compared to 33% in 2015. 
4. On Green development: 
o Energy intensity per unit MVA to be cut by 18% in 2020 and 
34% in 2025 compared to 2015 levels. 
o CO2 emission per unit MVA to be cut by 22% in 2020 and 
40% in 2025 as compared to 2015 levels. 
o Water consumption per unit MVA to be cut by 23% in 2020 
and 41% in 2025 as compared to 2015 levels. 
o Industrial waste recovery to be raised to 73% in 2020 and 79% 
in 2025 as compared to 65% in 2015. 
These targets cover all industries and in essence, turn the entire 
manufacturing sectors into innovation mode. 
Summary of Findings at macro-level: 
        Our findings indicated that the government is still playing an active and 
important role on national capacity building at the micro-level. At the same time, it 
is playing an even more active industrial policy formulator and facilitator role with 
the Made in China 2025 plan at the meso-level. The continuing active involvement 
of the government provides the necessary pre-conditions for success of Made in 
China 2025 plan at the macro-level. The demonstrated ability of the Chinese 
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government in running its industrial policy since the reform opening in 1978 under 
state capitalism model adds optimism to the fulfilment of the pre-condition212.  
 
  
                                                            
212 Kurlantzick, J. (2016). China's State Capitalism. In State Capitalism (pp. 93-114). New York, 
US: Oxford University Press. 
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Chapter 7 - Discussion  
         The dissertation looks at the research question- “Does China have the 
necessary pre-conditions for transformation into an innovation economy under its 
4th Industrial Revolution plan? “. We posited that neo-Schumpeterian Economics 
provided the most suitable theoretical framework in the dissertation, over the 
conventional Solow model or the New Structural Economics. This argument of 
using neo-Schumpeterian economics in the Chinese context to address economic 
growth issues facing the country’s transition is novel and fills an important gap in 
the discipline.   
        Neo-Schumpeterian Economics looks at the innovation driven economic 
development at three levels. At the micro-level, it examines whether the country 
has built the national capacity of innovation and execution.  The national capacity 
of innovation represents the human resources base, while the national capacity of 
innovation execution represents the entrepreneurship available on individual and 
corporate level.  
        The national capacity of innovation and execution are conceptual ideas under 
neo-Schumpeterian analysis. In the case of innovation capacity, the idea is 
operationalized by looking at tertiary enrolment, R&D personnel, R&D spending, 
quality of R&D research papers and the relative position of R&D output of China 
among global peers. In the case of execution ability, we look at the formation of 
new business, corporate size and patent activities. The specific technological 
breakthrough under the ten targeted industries in Made in China 2025 program are 
a mixed bag of new technological breakthroughs and catch-ups, in fact, catch-up 
technologies represent the majority in the list. We analyse the standing of Chinese 
in the 35 technological fields under global PCT patent system. 
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         The micro-level national capacity build-up is the most tedious step in the drive 
toward an innovation driven economy for any country. The effort takes time and 
persistence. The thesis findings indicated that China has already succeeded in 
building up a huge and diverse base in both industrial capacity and high-level 
human capital formation to drive an innovation-based economy. The process started 
right after the reform movement in late 1970s and early 1980s. It is initially gradual 
and uneventful, but the scale effect soon set in around early to mid-2000s. The 
findings at the micro-level show exponential type of growth in tertiary enrolment, 
R&D personnel, R&D research budget, R&D research paper output, indigenous 
business patent registration, rising ranking of Chinese patent and research paper 
among global peers starting around that period. While people noted the 
breakthrough of Chinese science and technologies one after the other in recent years, 
the foundation was actually laid decades ago213. 
       The successful build-up of national capacity on innovation provides the micro-
level pre-condition to the success of China in its innovation drive under Made in 
China 2025. The national capacity is durable and persistent. It lays a solid 
foundation to efforts at meso-level and macro-level. 
       The second level of analysis is the industrial meso-level analysis. The meso-
level is the monetization level of innovation and its success directly impacts the 
economy. Neo-Schumpeterian analysis uses the technological framework to look at 
the pre-conditions in setting up a successful new industry. The framework stated 
that four areas must be looked into and successfully resolved when a country wants 
                                                            
213 Professor John Wong brought out this sudden upsurge of breakthrough from scale effect of a 
huge human capital base in one of his lecture to the author. The original idea came from the late 
Dr. Goh Keng Swee.  
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to setup new industry. These four areas are: First, how to acquire the learning 
opportunity to technologies in the new industry. Second, how to appropriate the 
necessary reward to keep the sustainability of the industry. Third, how important is 
the earlier accumulation of industry knowledge to the successful operation of the 
industry. Fourth, how many allied industries’ knowhow and how critical are them 
to the industry’s success.  
       We developed the following model based on the technological regime to 
explain the HSR industry’s technology and market innovation at the meso-level.  
 
Source: adopted from Mu214 and modified by the author 
Fig 89 
 Model on Technology and Market Innovation on HSR in China 
 
 
                                                            
214 Mu, Q., & Lee, K. (2005). Knowledge diffusion, market segmentation and technological catch-
up: The case of the telecommunication industry in China Research Policy, 34, 759-783. Retrieved 
April 25, 2016, from http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0048733305000946/1-s2.0-S0048733305000946-
main.pdf?_tid=a799789e-0a97-11e6-bdf3-
00000aacb361&acdnat=1461555895_22ed320f5c27866d3e3488f55519fddb 
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A look at the model immediately reveals the importance of two elements 
in the starting column of the model- the indigenous technological opportunities 
and government policy. These two boxes initiate all subsequent linkages and 
actions. 
           The HSR industry was selected in the thesis on following considerations: 
First, it is one of the industry under Made in China 2025. Second, it is an 
acknowledged success story on foreign technological adaptation story in China, as 
any successful business case is always an object of emulation. Third, the model that 
the thesis developed from the HSR experience remains valid today. It has good 
learning value and ready for adaptation in the other nine industrial sectors under 
Made in China 2025. 
      The findings indicated that there are two critical factors behind the success of 
the HSR industry setup: First is an enlightened institution that orchestrates all 
stakeholders to work together to overcome issues arising from the technological 
regime. Next is the   available national capacity to absorb the initial foreign 
technology and then proceed to develop improved indigenous technology.  
       The thesis argued that these two critical factors behind the success of the HSR 
industry are present in the country today. Though we do not examine the other nine 
industries under Made in China 2025, we can induce by logical extension that the 
same government that acts as the enlightened institution to orchestrate HSR 
industrial development is the same one implementing the Made in China 2025 plan. 
It is in good position to adjust the still valid winning model to use it in the other 
nine industries. The national capacity of innovation and execution is getting 
stronger as the scale effect of huge human capital base becoming more and more 
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apparent. The thesis posited that China possesses the pre-condition at the meso-
level to succeed in its innovation drive under Made in China 2025.   
       The third level of analysis is the government macro-level analysis. The 
government is expected to continue the active promotion of national capacity at 
micro-level and develop effective industrial policies at the meso-level. Analysis at 
this level is essentially examining the role of government in the innovation process 
of the country, looking at its past record and by logical extension, determine 
whether the country possesses the necessary pre-conditions to continue the success 
in striving toward an innovation driven economy.  
       The chapter on macro-level analysis indicated that the Chinese government is 
actively promoting the continuing build-up of national innovation and execution 
capacity at micro-level and actively pushing industrial policies through Made in 
China 2025 plan. The country’s success in this two areas is widely acclaimed and 
attested by its rapid economic growth and climbing up of industrial value chain. 
The country had alleviated more than 600 million people out of poverty in the last 
37 years and the country is already the biggest country in terms of PPP GDP and 
marching to the biggest nominal GDP country in the next two decades215. The 
government has stated repeatedly that the industrial development model of China 
based on market signal and government leadership (市场指导， 政府引领) is the 
state economic policy.   
       The success of the Chinese industrial policy has revived interest on state 
capitalism. According to Council on Foreign Relation Senior Fellow, Joshua 
                                                            
215 Wong, J. (2016). Taking Stock of China's Past Economic Growth and Its Future Prospect. 
In Zhu Rongji and China's Economic Take-off (pp. 3-38). Imperial College Press. 
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Kurlantzick, “The Chinese growth is not a result of a country with a large 
population and entrepreneurial drives opening to the world. The growth is due to a 
significant measure to its careful economic strategy, its relatively efficient state 
capitalism combining economic strength and adaptability. The Chinese model 
could be a genuine challenge to free-market capitalism.216”  
       The demonstrated success of the Chinese government in their national capacity 
building and past industrial policies provide the logical extension to our assertion 
that China possesses the necessary pre-conditions to succeed at the macro-level 
under neo-Schumpeterian framework. 
        The three-level analysis clearly show their interlocking nature. The micro-
level build-up of national capacity is a result of deliberate long term macro-level 
strategy. It takes decades and it is difficult to consistently implement on the ground. 
The success at the meso-level relies on the foundation provided by the micro-level 
factors and the orchestration at the macro-level. While the success at the macro-
level depends on the continuing active state promotion at the micro-level and meso-
level. The interplay of these three levels is dynamic and their coordinated success 
defines whether China can use innovation as the driver of economic development 
under Made in China 2025. 
 
  
                                                            
216 Kurlantzick, J. (2016). A Greater Threat: State Capitalism's Long Term Effectiveness and State 
Capitalism as a Model. In State Capitalism (pp. 175-202). New York, US: Oxford University 
Press. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion: 
Key findings:  
The thesis affirmatively answers the research question, “Under its 4th 
Industrial Revolution plan, does China have the necessary pre-conditions to 
transform into an innovation-driven economy?”.  The thesis uses the three-level 
neo-Schumpeterian framework to analyse the pre-conditions and demonstrated that 
China does possess the necessary pre-conditions.  
We have identified the necessary pre-conditions for Made in China 2025 to 
transform the Chinese economy into an innovation-driven economy. These pre-
conditions are: at the micro level: human capital; an entrepreneurial spirit; 
corporations that can provide entrepreneurship; innovation and execution capacities 
at the firm and industrial levels. At the meso-level: using the model developed under 
neo-Schumpeterian framework of technological regime, we look at whether China 
had the capacity to create entry opportunities for higher value-added activities in 
old industries and gain entry to new industries. At the macro level: examine whether 
the government has established a good record as an effective state capitalist that can 
continue to foster the elements at the micro and meso-level. The government’s 
continuing active involvement at micro-level national capacity building and meso-
level industrial policies formulation and implementation set the ground for 
innovations to succeed at the macro-level. These three levels interlock and they 
must work together in a systemic and coordinated way to deliver the innovations to 
transform the economy.  
We have demonstrated that China has the pre-conditions to be successful in 
this transformation. At the micro-level, the thesis showed that China had 
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successfully build-up the national capacity for continuing innovation at different 
disciplines. At the meso-level, we developed a model of innovation using the 
development case of Chinese high speed rail and argued by extension that the same 
successful model can also work in the other nine industries under the 4th Industrial 
Revolution plan. At the macro-level, we highlight the continuing participation of 
the government in building the national capacity and formulation of industrial 
policies.  
        The most challenging work in the three level neo-Schumpeterian analysis 
framework is the micro-level implementation. The success at this level takes 
decades of ground work and the scale is nationwide. However, once it is properly 
set in place, the national capacity provides the necessary foundation for the other 
two levels. 
Research Limitations:  
Economic development is a broad topic with many dynamic parts moving 
at the same time. This case is much more so in China, where the speed and scale of 
its economic development make any definite claim of knowing the true economic 
dynamics of China difficult. Our attempt to use basic neo-Schumpeterian 
Economics to understand China’s 4th Industrial Revolution plan, Made in China 
2025, is academically interesting and relevant. However, due to constraint in both 
data and methodology, our work is subjected to many limitations. We hope that our 
empirical neo-Schumpeterian Economics analysis will attract other scholars to 
work on the topic.  
 
 
 ‐ 172 ‐ | P a g e  
 
 
Future Research Recommendations: 
Using neo-Schumpeterian framework provides an ex-ante lens to look at 
economic growth program, particularly for country that falls under Middle 
Income Trap. There are many research opportunities in this area. 
1. The paper developed an industry development model and it can be used 
to assess the efficacy of many developing countries economic 
development program. Most of the countries’ economic development 
programs are really industrial development program. They are often top 
down and use aggregate monetary parameters with little consideration 
to micro-level conditions and industry technology acquisition constraint. 
Our framework could be useful in doing an ex-ante assessment of such 
program. 
2. Many developing countries face technological choice in their attempt to 
introduce new industries. Our industrial development model can be 
useful to work at the issue closely. This technological choice often 
determines whether a country can enjoy late-comer advantage and move 
into leapfrogging stage after foreign technology learning, or suffers 
from perennial late-comer disadvantages and always resign to catch-up 
role. 
3. The paper determined two factors as critical in industrial catch-up and 
leapfrog: an effective organizational sponsor and a good micro-human 
resources foundation. They could serve as good guideposts to future 
studies of economic growth policy setup. 
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4. The role of innovation in driving growth is difficult to analyse due to 
both conceptual (presence of moderating factors) and data limitations. 
Most empirical works concentrate on the process of technological 
change, using quantitative inputs such as R&D investment, the number 
of researchers and assumed output such as number of patents and 
scientific publications. It is convenient to use regression to link input 
and output, but the relationship between both is probably more 
complicated. More study on the relationship of input and output on 
scientific innovation is needed.  
5. OECD reports that four countries, namely the US, UK, Germany and 
China, account for 50-70% of high-impact publications across all 
scientific disciplines. These four countries’ R&D spending accounts for 
58% of the total spending of the top 40 countries in R&D. The positive 
relationship between R&D spending and output is without doubt. 
However, China built up its economy prior to becoming a research 
power house, and it took full advantage of its backwardness to adopt 
technology cheaply without expensive R&D. China’s R&D budget 
broke 1% of GDP in 2000 and 2% of GDP in 2012. Its economy 
experienced booming growth in the 2000s. There are many studies 
pointing to the wastage of Chinese public R&D but few are insightful. 
This is a research area that could be relevant for many developing 
countries. 
6. Neo-Schumpeterian analysis focuses on the mechanisms of growth in 
the real economy. It does not touch on the issue of monetary economics.  
Notable Schumpeterian economist, Horst Hanush had proposed more 
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studies on the relationship between the real economy, monetary 
economics and government fiscal policy217. This is certainly also an area 
worthy of exploring. 
7. Neo-Schumpeterian Economics is a good tool to study the Chinese 
economy, as public policy plays an important role in it. We can look at 
the policy effect as the organizational innovation that triggers creative 
destruction or creative accumulation. How one can translate these 
organizational innovations into concrete capital accumulation --total 
factor productivity in the Solow model -- will be very relevant to policy 
design and monitoring. It is generally recognized today that neo-
Schumpeterian Economics allows policy formulation but monitoring its 
impact takes time, as it is often side-tracked by noises from other 
economic events. Research to bridge the gap between the two school of 
thoughts can be important to policy makers.  
8. We have demonstrated the necessary conditions for an innovation-
driven economy under a Neo-Schumpeterian framework. This is the 
real side of the economy. However, stable macroeconomic 
fundamentals on the monetary side are also very important for the 
healthy development of the real economy. A volatile and unstable 
economy will suppress demand and eliminate market opportunities for 
innovation to benefit entrepreneurs. More research can be done on these 
monetary or macroeconomic constraints on innovation. 
                                                            
i217 Hanusch, H., & Pyka A. (2007). Principles of Neo-Schumpeterian Economics. Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 31 (2007), 275-289.  
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9. Observations on the ground indicate that technological innovations are 
closely connected to an industry ecosystem rather than the earlier, 
simpler case of entrepreneurs and corporations218.  This type of research 
is usually conducted in proprietary industry reports and is expensive to 
obtain. Open academic reports are rare, and this is definitely an area to 
look into. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
218 Berger, S., & MIT Task Force on Production in the Innovation Economy. (n.d.). Making in 
America: From Innovation to Market. MIT Press.  
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